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Abstract
We study the communication complexity of welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions
with m items and two subadditive bidders. A 1/2-approximation can be guaranteed by a trivial
randomized protocol with zero communication, or a trivial deterministic protocol with O(1)
communication. We show that outperforming these trivial protocols requires exponential com-
munication, settling an open question of [Fei09].
Specifically, we show that any (randomized) protocol guaranteeing a (1/2+6/log
2
m)-approximation
requires communication exponential inm. This is tight even up to lower-order terms: we further
present a (1/2+ 1/O(logm))-approximation in poly(m) communication.
To derive our results, we introduce a new class of subadditive functions that are “far from”
fractionally subadditive functions, and may be of independent interest for future works. Beyond
our main result, we consider the spectrum of valuations between fractionally-subadditive and
subadditive via the MPH hierarchy. Finally, we discuss the implications of our results towards
combinatorial auctions with strategic bidders.
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1. Introduction
Background. Combinatorial auctions have been a driving force of Algorithmic Game Theory
since its inception: how should one allocate goods among interested parties? That is, if a central
designer has a setM ofm indivisible goods to allocate, and each of n players has a valuation function
vi : 2
M → R+ (private, known only to player i), we wish to partition the items to maximize the
social welfare (
∑
i vi(Si), where Si denotes the items received by player i in the partition).
This fundamental problem has received significant attention in various models: with or without
incentives, with or without restrictions on valuations, with or without computational limits on
the players, etc. In this paper we prove standard communication lower bounds when players
have subadditive (also called complement-free) valuations.1 That is, our lower bounds rule out
the existence of good mechanisms even when players honestly follow the intended protocol, are
computationally unbounded, and are assumed to have subadditive valuation functions. The study
of combinatorial auctions specifically through the lens of communication complexity has a rich
history dating back to early works of Blumrosen, Nisan, and Segal [Nis00, BN02, NS06], as such
lower bounds sidestep challenging debates on appropriate behavioral assumptions. See Section 1.3
for a high-level overview of this literature, and specifically the role of communication complexity.
State of the art. On this front, the state-of-the-art is fairly remarkable: without any restrictions
on the valuations, a max{1/n, 1/O(√m)}-approximation can be achieved in poly(n,m) communica-
tion [LS05], and this is tight [NS06]. For fractionally subadditive valuations (also called XOS),2 a
(1 − (1 − 1/n)n)-approximation can be achieved in poly(n,m) communication [Fei09], and this is
tight [DNS10]. For subadditive valuations, a 1/2-approximation can be achieved in poly(n,m) com-
munication [Fei09], and no better than a (1/2 + 1/2n)-approximation can be achieved in poly(n,m)
communication [DNS10] (so this is tight as n → ∞). As such, remaining open problems in this
direction are scarce. The resolution of one such problem is the focus of this paper.
The case of n = 2. While Feige’s 1/2-approximation is tight as n → ∞, the n = 2 case was
posed as an open problem in [DNS10, Fei09]. It initially may seem unusual for the n = 2 case to be
singled out when the asymptotics are resolved, but there is substantial difference in the merits of
a 1/2-approximation for n = 2 and n > 2. Specifically, Feige’s 1/2-approximation for n > 2 employs
an incredibly sophisticated LP rounding, but the same guarantee is achieved by numerous trivial
algorithms when n = 2: (a) allocate all of M to a uniformly random player, (b) allocate each item
independently to a uniformly random player, (c) ask each player to report vi(M), and award M
to the highest bidder. Note that (a) and (b) are particularly trivial in that they are completely
oblivious to the valuations. (a) and (c) are particularly trivial in that they maintain their guarantee
even without subadditivity. All three can trivially be made into truthful auctions ((a) and (b) don’t
even solicit input, and are therefore truthful. (c) is simply a second-price auction on the grand
bundle M). So resolving the gap between 1/2 and 1/2 + 1/2n = 3/4 for n = 2 is not just a question
of determining the optimal constant, but really a question of whether it is possible to achieve any
non-trivial guarantee. The main result of this paper answers no:
Main Result (Informal). For two subadditive players, the aforementioned trivial protocols ensuring
a 1/2-approximation are optimal among those with subexponential communication.
Implications. Before overviewing our construction and extensions, we wish to highlight two
immediate implications of our results for combinatorial auctions with strategic bidders, via two
recent reductions which renewed further interest specifically in the n = 2 case.
1A valuation function is subadditive if for all S, T v(S ∪ T ) ≤ v(S) + v(T ).
2A valuation is fractionally subadditive if it can be written as a maximum over additive functions.
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(1) The power of truthful vs. non-truthful communication-efficient protocols: The central driv-
ing theme of algorithmic mechanism design is understanding the relative power of truthful vs. non-
truthful “efficient” protocols [NR01]. Remarkably, when “efficient” refers to “communication-
efficient,” no separation is known to exist — for any valuation class or agent number — despite
significant gaps in the state-of-the-art approximation ratios (see Section 1.3 for further detail,
along with a brief discussion of related results concerning computational efficiency). Recent work
of [Dob16b] provides a deep structural connection between truthful communication-efficient combi-
natorial auctions and simultaneous (non-truthful) communication-efficient combinatorial auctions
specifically when n = 2,3 thereby proposing extensive study of the n = 2 case to search for the first
separation. On this front, our result proves that in fact no separation exists for n = 2 subadditive
buyers, as the aforementioned trivial protocols (now proved to be optimal) are also truthful.
(2) Price of Anarchy of simple mechanisms: One measure by which the performance of (non-
truthful) combinatorial auctions is quantified in strategic settings is the (Bayesian) price of anarchy
(BPoA), defined as the worst ratio between the (expected) welfare of the worst equilibrium and
the optimal (expected) welfare. For subadditive valuations, simultaneous first price auctions are
known to have BPoA at least 1/2 [FFGL13], and this is tight, even for two agents [CKST16]. Can
auction formats other than first price do better? Roughgarden provides a framework for translating
communication lower bounds to BPoA bounds [Rou14]. Together with our new lower-bound result,
the framework (in particular Theorem VI.1) immediately implies that no auction format with sub-
doubly-exponentially many strategies achieves BPoA better than 1/2. This proves that simultaneous
first-price auctions are optimal among this class for all n.
1.1. Main Result and Intuition
Main Theorem. Any (randomized) protocol that guarantees a 1/2+ 6/log2(m)-approximation to the
optimal welfare for two monotone subadditive bidders requires communication Ω(e
√
m).
We now provide some intuition for the main steps. The first step in our proof is the construction
of a new class of subadditive functions (Section 3). One key feature of our class, if it is to possibly
demonstrate hardness better than 3/4, is that it must not also be fractionally-subadditive (due to
Feige’s 3/4-approximation [Fei09]). Only one general construction exists in prior work (based on
Set Cover — see Section 3 for precise description) [Fei09, BR11a].4 This class is our starting point.
From here, though, we encounter the following barrier: Consider the following line of reasoning,
assuming that there exists some set T for which v1(T ) + v1(T¯ ) ≥ (1 + 4ε)v1(M). Then allocating
player 1 either T or T¯ uniformly at random (and the rest to player 2) guarantees welfare at least
v1(M)/2+2εv1(M)+v2(T )/2+v2(T¯ )/2 ≥ OPT/2+2εv1(M) by subadditivity of v2(·). So if v1(M) ≥
OPT/4, this allocation guarantees a (1/2 + ε)-approximation. If not, then v2(M) ≥ 3OPT/4, and
awarding all items to player 2 guarantees a 3/4-approximation. It is not hard to combine these
observations into a simple, deterministic protocol guaranteeing a (1/2+ ε)-approximation whenever
such a set T exists.
So in order to possibly demonstrate hardness better than (1/2+ ε), our class must further have
the property that for all T , and all v(·) in our class, v(T ) + v(T¯ ) ∈ [v(M), (1 + ε)v(M)]. That is,
v(·) must essentially appear additive at the large scale (but may be subadditive at smaller scales).
3There are also implications when n > 2, but not quite as strong as for n = 2.
4It is known that every subadditive function f admits a fractionally-subadditive function that is log(m)-close to
f [Dob07, BR11a], and this bound is tight by the construction given in [BR11a], based on set cover. It is also known
that any valuation function for which v(S) ∈ {1, 2} for any non-trivial S is also subadditive. But such functions
trivially admit a 3/4-approximation, and therefore don’t serve as a useful starting point.
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Indeed, our construction starts with the previous Set-Cover construction and essentially hard-
codes that v(T ) + v(T¯ ) = v(M) for all T , in a way that maintains subadditivity. We defer further
details to Section 3, but do wish to note that this construction itself is likely to be of independent
interest for future work, due to the scarcity of known subadditive functions that are “far from”
fractionally-subadditive. Indeed, our results are the first instance where a non-trivial approximation
guarantee is achievable for fractionally-subadditive valuations, but no non-trivial approximation is
achievable for subadditive.
From here, we are able to show that our constructions are rich enough to encode Equality.5
Essentially, the property v(T ) + v(T¯ ) = v(M) is extremely convenient, as it immediately implies
that OPT = v1(M) whenever v1(·) = v2(·). As such, our remaining task is to find a doubly-
exponentially-large subset V of our class of valuations for which: (a) v(M) = ℓ for all v ∈ V and
(b) OPT(v(·), w(·)) ≈ 2ℓ for all v,w ∈ V. By the convenient property, beating a 1/2-approximation
when both players have valuations from this subset is exactly deciding whether v1(·) = v2(·), thereby
completing a reduction from Equality. Of course, this only proves our claim for deterministic
protocols, as Equality is only hard for deterministic communication. We include a complete
proof of this reduction in Section 4 in order to highlight the important aspects of our construction
without yet requiring any advanced communication complexity.
Finally, we prove our full lower bound for randomized protocols in Section 5. Unfortunately,
our construction is really an instance of Equality, and is extremely unlikely to admit a reduction
from known problems that require exponential randomized communication (such as Disjointness
or Gap-Hamming-Distance). Instead, we propose a new “near-Equality” problem (that we
call Exist-Far-Sets), and directly prove that it requires exponential randomized communication
via the information complexity approach of [BJKS04, Bra12, BGPW13]. While these tools are
now standard in the communication complexity community, they have yet to break into the AGT
community. As such, we provide a full exposition in Section 5 (and the associated appendices).
Again, we wish to note that Exist-Far-Sets itself may well be of independent interest for future
work, especially at the intersection of communication complexity and mechanism design where
there is demand for such constructions.
1.2. Extensions
Our main result concerns subadditive valuations (for which we prove that a 1/2-approximation is
optimal), which are a proper superclass of fractionally-subadditive (for which a 3/4-approximation is
previously shown to be optimal [Fei09, DNS10]). In Section 6, we further consider the space between
fractionally-subadditive and subadditive valuations via the Maximum-over-Positive-Hypergraphs
(MPH) hierarchy [FFI+15]. We postpone a formal definition to Section 6, but note that fractionally-
subadditive valuations are equivalent to MPH-1, that all monotone functions lie in MPH-m, and
that all subadditive functions lie in MPH-m/2. Our second result is a new protocol for welfare-
maximization with two MPH-k bidders:
Theorem. There exists a protocol that guarantees a 1/2 + 1/O(log k) of the optimal welfare for two
bidders whose valuations are both subadditive and MPH-k with poly(m) communication.
In particular, our protocol is an oblivious rounding of the configuration LP.6 We also wish to
5In Equality, Alice and Bob are each given k-bit strings as input, and are asked to decide whether they are
equal or not. Equality is known to require deterministic communication k to solve, but admits efficient randomized
protocols.
6That is, while communication is indeed needed to optimally solve the configuration LP, no further communication
is necessary in order to round the resulting solution. See [FFT16] for further discussion on the merits of oblivious
versus non-oblivious rounding.
3
note an important corollary of this theorem, when combined with our main result. Our main result
proves that a (1/2 + 6/logm)-approximation is impossible with subexponential communication. As
all subadditive functions are MPH-m/2, this implies that our protocol and lower bound are tight
even up to lower-order terms.
Additionally, as our construction does not admit a (1/2+6/logm)-approximation in subexponential
communication, it establishes the existence of a constant C such that our constructions are provably
not MPH-Cm. This serves as an additional proof for the existence of subadditive functions that lie
in high levels of the MPH hierarchy. The key property we use to claim our guarantee for MPH-k
may also be useful for future work to claim lower bounds on the MPH level of specific functions.
1.3. Related Work
Communication complexity of combinatorial auctions. The works most related to ours
concern the standard communication complexity of combinatorial auctions. The tables below sum-
marize prior work for various valuation classes. While the n = 2 table is most relevant for the
present paper, the general n table is included for reference. Note that no separate row is needed
for hardness of truthful communication, because no such results are known (aside from general
communication hardness).
n = 2 Submodular XOS Subadditive General
Communication hardness 1718 [DV13]
3
4 [DNS10]
3
4 [DNS10]
1
2 [NS06]
Communication protocol 1317 [FV10]
3
4 [Fei09]
1
2 [Trivial]
1
2 [Trivial]
Truthful comm. protocol 12 [Trivial]
1
2 [Trivial]
1
2 [Trivial]
1
2 [Trivial]
General n Submodular XOS Subadditive General
Comm. hardness 1− 12e [DV13] 1− (1− 1n)n [DNS10] 12 + 12n [DNS10] max{ 1n , 1Ω(√m)} [NS06]
Comm. protocol 1− 1e + 10−5 [FV10] 1− (1− 1n)n [Fei09] 12 [Fei09] max{ 1n , 1√2m} [LS05]
Truthful comm. 1
O(
√
logm)
[Dob16a] 1
O(
√
logm)
[Dob16a] 1O(logm log logm) [Dob07] max{ 1n , 1√2m} [LS05]
For context, it is worth noting that all referenced (truthful or not) communication protocols
take one of two forms. The first is via solving a particular LP relaxation (called the configuration
LP) and rounding the fractional optimum [FV10, Fei09, LS05]. The second is via mechanisms which
randomly sample a fraction of bidders to gather statistics, then run a posted-price mechanism on the
remaining bidders [Dob16a, Dob07]. Both classes of mechanisms require bidders to communicate
demand queries. That is, bidders are asked questions of the form: “For item prices p1, . . . , pm,
which set of items maximizes vi(S) −
∑
j∈S pj?” All of the aforementioned protocols/mechanisms
make polynomially many demand queries, and have further polynomial-time overhead.
Recent work of [Dob16b] proves a surprising connection between two-player truthful combina-
torial auctions, and two-player simultaneous (non-truthful) protocols. In particular, any separa-
tion between the approximation guarantees achievable by communication-efficient protocols and
communication-efficient simultaneous protocols would constitute the first separatation between
truthful and non-truthful communication-efficient protocols. Such separations were already known
for large n [ANRW15, Ass17], but not for n = 2 (and therefore aren’t relevant to Dobzinski’s frame-
work). As such, the n = 2 setting is now receiving extra attention, although the desired separation
still remains elusive [BMW18].
Related results on combinatorial auctions. As previously referenced, combinatorial auctions
are studied via other complexity lenses as well. The most popular alternative is the value-queries
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model, or standard computational complexity. That is, each bidder is capable only of querying
their valuation function on a given set (value query), or has access to the explicit (poly-sized)
circuit which computes a value query. In both models, a tight (1 − 1/e)-approximation is known
for submodular valuations [Von08, MSV08, DV12b], and a tight Θ(1/
√
m)-approximation is known
for XOS and subadditive valuations [DNS10]. To reconcile these latter impossibility results with
the above-referenced positive results, observe that it generally requires exp(m) value queries (or
is NP-hard with explicit circuit access) to compute a demand query. Unlike the communication
model, strong separations between guarantees of truthful and non-truthful mechanisms are known
in these models [PSS08, BDF+10, BSS10, DSS15, Dob11, DV12a, DV12b]. It is also worth noting
that some of these approaches also yield communication lower bounds for the restricted class of
Maximal-in-Range/VCG-based protocols [BSS10, BDF+10, DSS15]. For further details of these
results, see [DSS15, Table 1].
1.4. Summary
We study the communication complexity of welfare maximization in two-player combinatorial auc-
tions. Our main result establishes that the trivial 1/2-approximations are in fact optimal among
all protocols with subexponential communication. We additionally develop a (1/2 + 1/O(log k))-
approximation whenever both buyers are subadditive and MPH-k. Our key innovation is a new class
of subadditive functions that are “far from” fractionally subadditive, and may be of independent
interest for future works. In addition to resolving an open question of [Fei09, DNS10], our results
establish the following corollaries: (a) There is no gap between the approximation ratios achievable
by truthful and not-necessarily-truthful mechanisms with poly(m) communication for two subad-
ditive bidders, (b) For any number of subadditive bidders, simultaneous first price auctions achieve
the optimal price of anarchy (1/2) among all auctions with sub-doubly-exponentially-many strate-
gies (via [Rou14]), (c) Our lower bound is tight even up to lower order terms (1/2 + 1/O(logm) is
achievable in poly(m) communication, but no better).
2. Preliminaries
We consider the following problem. There is a set M of m items. Alice and Bob each have a
valuation function A(·) and B(·), respectively that takes as input subsets of M and outputs an
element of R+. Moreover, A(·) and B(·) are both monotone (v(X ∪ Y ) ≥ v(X) for all X,Y ) and
subadditive (v(X ∪ Y ) ≤ v(X) + v(Y )). Alice and Bob wish to communicate as little as possible
about their valuation functions in order to find a welfare-maximizing allocation (that is, the X
maximizing A(X) + B(M \ X)). Formally, we study the following decision problem – observe
that this is a promise problem for which if the input does not satisfy the promise, any output is
considered correct.
Definition 2.1 (Welfare-Maximization(m,α)). Welfare-Maximization is a communication
problem between Alice and Bob:
• Alice’s Input: A(·), a monotone subadditive function over 2[m]; and a target C.
• Bob’s Input: B(·), a monotone subadditive function over 2[m]; and a target D.
• Promise: C = D. Also, there either exists an S ⊆ [m] satisfying A(S) + B(S) ≥ C, or for
all S ⊆ [m], A(S) +B(S) < αC.
• Output: 1 if ∃S ⊆ [m], A(S) +B(S) ≥ C; 0 if ∀S ⊆ [m], A(S) +B(S) < αC.
We will sometimes drop the parameter m when it is irrelevant. We will also refer to any protocol
solving Welfare-Maximization(m,α) as an α-approximation for Welfare-Maximization(m).
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Also of interest is the corresponding search problem, which instead asks Alice and Bob to find
an X maximizing A(X)+B(X) (and an α-approximation is a protocol guaranteeing a Y satisfying
A(Y ) + B(Y ) ≥ maxX⊆M{A(X) + B(X)}). It is easy to see that any poly(m)-communication
protocol for the search problem implies a poly(m)-communication protocol for the decision problem
(with an extra round of communication). As such, we will prove all lower bounds against the
decision problem (as they immediately imply to search as well), and develop all protocols for the
search problem (as they immediately imply to decision as well).
3. Main Construction
In this section, we present our base construction. In subsequent sections, we show how to leverage
this construction to derive our lower bounds. We begin by considering a collection of subsets S =
{S1, . . . , Sk} where each Si ⊆ M , and defining a useful property that S may possess. Throughout
this section, let ℓ denote an even integer ≥ 4. Some proofs are deferred to Appendix A.
Definition 3.1 (ℓ-sparse). We say that S is ℓ-sparse if for all T1, . . . , Tℓ−1 ∈ S, ∪jTj 6=M .
That is, S is ℓ-sparse if there do not exist ℓ − 1 elements of S such that their union is the
entire ground set M . We now follow [Fei09, BR11a] in defining a class of valuation functions
parameterized by a collection of sets. Specifically, let S = {S1, . . . , Sk} be an ℓ-sparse collection.
For X ⊆M , define
σS(X) :=
{
min
{|Y | : Y ⊆ [k],X ⊆ ⋃i∈Y Si} , if X is covered by S;
max{ℓ, k}, otherwise;
where we say “X is covered by S” if X ⊆ ⋃i∈[k] Si. That is, σS(X) is the smallest number of sets
from S whose union contains X, or some large number max{ℓ, k} if there are no such sets.7 We
can now define our valuation function f ℓS(·):
(a) If σS(X) < ℓ2 , then define f
ℓ
S(X) = σS(X) and f
ℓ
S(X) = ℓ− σS(X).
(b) For any X whose value is not defined in (a), f ℓS(X) =
ℓ
2 .
It is not immediately clear that f ℓS(·) is well-defined; indeed, if σS(X) and σS(X) are both < ℓ2 ,
then f ℓS(X) is doubly defined. Fortunately, this can never occur when S is ℓ-sparse.
Lemma 3.1. If S is ℓ-sparse, then f ℓS(·) is well-defined.
Now, we would like to prove that f ℓS is monotone and subadditive whenever S is ℓ-sparse
(Corollary 3.3). The following facts about f ℓS and σS highlight the key steps in the proof.
Lemma 3.2. Let S be ℓ-sparse. Then:
(1) σS is monotone and subadditive.
(2) For all X, f ℓS(X) = ℓ− f ℓS(X).
(3) If σS(X) < ℓ2 or f
ℓ
S(X) <
ℓ
2 , then f
ℓ
S(X) = σS(X).
(4) If f ℓS(X) >
ℓ
2 then f
ℓ
S(X) = ℓ− σS(X).
(5) For all X, f ℓS(X) ≤ σS(X).
Corollary 3.3. If S is ℓ-sparse, then f ℓS(·) is monotone and subadditive.
Functions of the form f ℓS(·) will form the basis of our lower bound constructions, which we
overview in the following sections.
7Defining σS(X) :=∞ if X is not covered by S would have worked as well.
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4. Deterministic Protocols for Subadditive Valuations
The construction in Section 3 gets us most of the way towards our deterministic lower bound. The
remaining step is a reduction from Equality. To briefly remind the reader, Alice receives input
a ∈ {0, 1}k , and Bob receives input b ∈ {0, 1}k . Their goal is to output yes if ai = bi for all i ∈ [k],
and no otherwise. It is well-known (see, e.g., [KN97]) that any deterministic protocol for Equality
requires communication ≥ k.
Theorem 4.1. For any even integer ℓ ∈ [4, log2(m)], any deterministic communication protocol
that guarantees a (1/2+1/ℓ)-approximation toWelfare-Maximization(m) requires communication
exp (m/ℓ·2ℓ). In particular, a guarantee of 1/2 + ε requires communication eεm/2
1/ε
= eΩ(m), and a
guarantee of 1/2+ 2/log(m) requires communication em
Ω(1)
.
Before proceeding with our construction, we’ll need one more property of collections of sets:
Definition 4.1 ([KS73]). A collection S = {S1, . . . , Sk} is ℓ-independent if {T1, . . . , Tk} is ℓ-sparse
whenever Ti ∈ {Si, Si}.
In other words, S is ℓ-independent if we can choose either Si or Si independently, for each i, and
form an ℓ-sparse collection no matter our choices. We now proceed with our reduction, which relies
on the existence of large ℓ-independent collections (such collections are known to exist; at the end
of this section we give a precise statement and a proof appears in Appendix A for completeness).
Proposition 4.2. Let S be an ℓ-independent collection with |S| = k. Then any deterministic
communication protocol that guarantees a (1/2 + 1/2ℓ−3)-approximation to the optimal welfare for
two monotone subadditive bidders requires communication at least k.
Proof. Let S = {S1, . . . , Sk} be ℓ-independent. For each i, define S1i := Si, and S0i := Si. Now,
consider an instance of Equality where Alice is given a and Bob is given b. Alice will create the
valuation function f ℓA, where A := {Sa11 , . . . , Sakk } (i.e. Alice builds A by taking either S1i or S0i ,
depending on ai). Bob will create the valuation function f
ℓ
B, where B := {Sb11 , . . . , Sbkk }. Observe
first that f ℓA(·) and f ℓB(·) are indeed well-defined, monotone, and subadditive as S is ℓ-independent
(and therefore A and B are both ℓ-sparse).
Observe that if a = b, then A = B and moreover f ℓA(·) = f ℓB(·). So immediately by part (2) of
Lemma 3.2, the maximum possible total welfare is ℓ (indeed, any partition of the items gives welfare
ℓ). On the other hand, if there exists an i such that ai 6= bi (without loss of generality say that
ai = 1 and bi = 0), we claim that welfare 2ℓ− 2 is achievable. To see this, consider the allocation
which awards Si to Alice and Si to Bob. Indeed, f
ℓ
A(Si) = 1 (as Si ∈ A), so f ℓA(Si) = ℓ − 1.
Similarly, fB(Si) = 1, so fB(Si) = ℓ− 1, achieving total welfare 2(ℓ− 1).8
So assume for contradiction that a deterministic 12 +
1
2ℓ−3 >
ℓ
2ℓ−2 -approximation exists to the
optimal welfare for 2 monotone subadditive bidders with communication < k. Then such a protocol
would solve Equality with communication < k by the reduction above, a contradiction.
Finally, in the next lemma we show how large k can be while guaranteeing an ℓ-independent
collection of size k to exist. This suffices to complete the proof of Theorem 4.1. The lemma is based
on a known existential construction using the probabilistic method, which we repeat for the sake of
completeness in Appendix A (explicit constructions of comparable guarantees also exist [Alo86]).
8As an aside, note that welfare exceeding 2ℓ− 2 is not possible, as Alice and Bob each value all non-empty sets at
least at 1, and therefore value all strict subsets of M at most at ℓ− 1 by (2). Therefore, the only way Alice or Bob
could have value exceeding ℓ− 1 is to get all of M , meaning that the other player receives value 0.
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Lemma 4.3. For all m, x > 1, and ℓ = log2(m)− log2(x), there exists a ℓ-independent collection
of subsets of [m] of size k = ex/ℓ.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Combine Proposition 4.2 and Lemma 4.3, and the observation that 2ℓ−3 ≥ ℓ
whenever ℓ ≥ 4. The “in particular” parts of the statement follow first by taking ℓ = 1/ε (implying
ℓ = log2(m) − log2(m/21/ε) and k = eεm/2
1/ε
, and then by taking ℓ = log2(m)/2 (implying ℓ =
log2(m)− log2(
√
m)) and k = e2
√
m/ log(m).
5. Randomized Protocols for Subadditive Valuations
The construction in Section 4 carries much of the intuition for our randomized lower bound. How-
ever, we clearly cannot reduce from Equality and get a randomized lower bound, as Equality
admits randomized communication-efficient protocols. As such, we will instead directly show that
a certain “near-Equality” problem requires exponential randomized communication. Our proof
uses the information complexity approach popularized in [BJKS04, Bra12, BGPW13], which is
now standard in that community. In order to introduce these tools to the AGT community, we will
provide a complete exposition starting from the basics.
Let’s first be clear about what a randomized protocol looks like. Alice and Bob have access to
a public infinite string of perfectly random bits, r. All messages sent by (e.g.) Alice may therefore
depend on her input, any messages sent by Bob, and r. At the end of the protocol, Alice and Bob
will guess yes or no, and the answer should be correct with probability 2/3.9 The protocol is only
“charged” communication for actual messages sent, and not for randomness used. The main result
of this section is as follows:
Theorem 5.1 (Randomized hardness). Any randomized protocol that guarantees a (1/2+ 6/log(m))-
approximation to Welfare-Maximization(m) requires communication complexity Ω(e
√
m).
Let’s now understand the issue with our previous construction. Aside from the fact that the
previous proof clearly does not extend to a randomized lower bound, the construction itself admits
a good randomized algorithm. Specifically, let S be some ℓ-independent set, and let exactly one of
{S, S} be in A for all S ∈ S (and also let exactly one of {S, S} be in B). Let Alice have valuation
f ℓA(·) and Bob have valuation f ℓB(·). The problem is that Alice and Bob are still just trying to
determine whether or not A = B (that is, if A = B, then the optimal welfare is at most ℓ. If
not, then the optimal welfare is 2ℓ − 2). Since A and B are both subsets of 2M , the randomized
algorithm for Equality for inputs of size 2m works.
The natural idea to try next is to reduce from a problem like Disjointness instead (for which
randomized protocols indeed require exponential communication). Let’s see one natural attempt
from our previous construction and why it fails (just for intuition, we will not exhaustively repeat
this for all possible reductions). Again let S denote an ℓ-independent collection, and again consider
any instance (A,B) of Disjointness of size k (recall that A and B are bitstrings of length k and
Disjointness asks to decide whether or not there exists an index i with Ai = Bi = 1). A first
attempt at a reduction might be to let A contain Si for all i such that Ai = 1, and B contain all
Si such that Bi = 1 (but A will never contain Si, and B will never contain Si). Indeed, with this
construction if there exists any index i with Ai = Bi = 1, the optimal welfare will be 2ℓ − 2 (give
Alice Si, and Bob Si). Unfortunately, even if there does not exist an index for which Ai = Bi = 1,
9As usual, the bound of 2/3 is arbitrary, as any protocol with success probability ≥ 1/2 + 1/poly(m) can be
repeated independently poly(m) times to achieve a protocol with success probability 2/3 (and then further repeated
to achieve success 1− 1/exp(m)).
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the welfare can still be ℓ − 1 + ℓ/2. To see this, consider any index i for which Ai = 1. Then
f ℓA(Si) = ℓ − 1. Moreover, as Si /∈ B, and S is ℓ-independent, f ℓB(Si) = ℓ/2 (because S is ℓ-
independent, neither Si nor Si can be covered with fewer than ℓ − 1 of the other sets in B. As
such, f ℓB(Si) = f
ℓ
B(Si) = ℓ/2). So while in the “yes” case, the welfare is indeed 2ℓ− 2 just like our
previous reduction, the welfare in the “no” case will be 3ℓ/2− 1 as opposed to ℓ, proving only that
a 3/4-approximation requires exponential randomized communication (which is already known). Of
course this is not a formal claim that no reduction from Disjointness is possible, but provides
some intuition for why searching for one (or from Gap-Hamming-Distance, etc.) is likely not the
right approach.
The issue is that our construction is getting much of its mileage from the fact that v(S)+v(S) = ℓ
for all S, and reducing from any problem except Equality fails to make use of this. So the plan
for our new construction is to observe that if v(·) and w(·) are almost the same (in a precise sense
defined shortly), then we can still claim that v(S) +w(S) ≈ ℓ for all S.
The main idea of our construction is as follows: consider still an ℓ-independent set S. For each
Si ∈ S, rather than adding either Si or Si to A, we will add either Si ∪ {j} or Si ∪ {j}, where j
is a uniformly random element of M (and ditto for B). Adding this random element to each set
barely changes the welfare, but makes it significantly harder for Alice and Bob to figure out whether
their valuations are nearly identical or not. We now proceed with the construction, followed by a
complete proof.
Definition 5.1. Two ordered collections of subsets X = 〈X1, . . . ,Xk〉;Y = 〈Y1, . . . , Yk〉 of M are
ℓ-compatible if
(1) |Xi| = |Yi| = m2 + 1 for all i.
(2) Either |Xi△Yi| = 2 or |Xi ∩ Yi| = 2 for all i.10
(3) X1, . . . ,Xk are ℓ-sparse, as are Y1, . . . , Yk.
(4) For any subset S ⊆ M of size less than ℓ2 , at least one of X1, . . . ,Xk contains S, as does at
least one of Y1, . . . , Yk.
The main idea is as follows: for any ℓ-compatible X ,Y, consider the valuation functions f ℓX (·)
and f ℓY(·). If for some i, |Xi ∩ Yi| = 2, this roughly corresponds to the “not equal” case in the
previous construction, and welfare near 2ℓ is achievable. If instead, for all i |Xi△Yi| = 2, this
roughly corresponds to the “equal” case in the previous construction, and welfare near ℓ is the best
achievable. We first state this formally, and then follow with a proof that randomized protocols
require exponential communication to distinguish these two cases.
Lemma 5.2. Let X ,Y be ℓ-compatible. If for some i, |Xi ∩ Yi| = 2, then welfare 2(ℓ − 1) is
achievable between f ℓX (·) and f ℓY(·). Otherwise, the maximum achievable welfare is at most ℓ+ 1.
Proof. Suppose that for some i, |Xi ∩ Yi| = 2. Consider the allocation that awards Yi to Alice and
Yi to Bob. Then Bob clearly has value ℓ − 1, as f ℓY(Yi) = ℓ − 1. Also, as |Yi| = |Xi| = m/2 + 1
and |Xi ∩ Yi| = 2, we necessarily have Xi ∪ Yi = M . This implies that Yi ⊇ Xi, and therefore
vℓX (Yi) ≥ vX (Xi) = ℓ − 1. So welfare 2ℓ − 2 is achievable (and again, optimal, as no bidder can
achieve value ℓ without receiving all of M).
Now suppose that for all i, |Xi△Yi| = 2, and further suppose for contradiction that total welfare
> ℓ+ 1 is achievable, by giving S to Alice and S to Bob. Then one of the players (without loss of
generality, say it is Bob) has value > ℓ2 , so it must have been the case that f
ℓ
Y(S) was defined to
be ℓ− σY(S), and σY(S) < ℓ2 .
10△ represents symmetric difference, |Xi ∪ Yi| − |Xi ∩ Yi|.
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Now, observe that because |Xi△Yi| = 2 for all i that σX (S) ≤ σY(S) + 1. Indeed, let S =
Yi1 ∪ · · · ∪YiσY(S) . Then there is exactly one element in Yij that is not also in Xij , and we therefore
conclude that |S \ (Xi1 ∪ · · · ∪XiσY (S))| ≤ σY(S) < ℓ/2. By criterion (4) of ℓ-compatibility, there
is some Xi that contains all of these elements, and so S ⊆ Xi ∪Xi1 ∪ · · · ∪XiσB(S) , witnessing that
σX (S) ≤ σY(S) + 1.
Finally, if σX (S) < ℓ2 then f
ℓ
X (S) = σX (S) ≤ σY(S) + 1, so the total welfare is at most ℓ + 1,
a contradiction. Otherwise, σX (S) = ℓ2 , which we claim implies that f
ℓ
X (S) ≤ ℓ/2. Indeed, if
f ℓX (S) > ℓ/2, then it is because σX (S) < ℓ/2. But then we would have σX (S) + σX (S) < ℓ,
implying a cover of M with < ℓ and contradicting ℓ-sparsity of X . Observe that in both cases we
may conclude that f ℓX (S) ≤ σℓX (S).
Now we may conclude that the total welfare is f ℓX (S) + f
ℓ
Y(S) ≤ σX (S) + ℓ − σY(S) ≤ ℓ + 1,
again a contradiction. We have now reached a contradiction from all branches starting from the
assumption that welfare > ℓ+ 1 is achievable, and may now conclude that the maximum possible
welfare is indeed ≤ ℓ+ 1, as desired.
The remaining step is now “simply” to show that distinguishing between the two cases requires
exponential randomized communication.
5.1. Far-Sets and Exist-Far-Sets
Towards proving our lower bound, we’ll define the following two problems, which may themselves
be of independent interest, at least within the combinatorial auctions community, as a “near-
Equality” problem which requires exponential randomized communication. Below, note that
both Far-Sets and Exist-Far-Sets are promise problems: if the input doesn’t satisfy any of the
stated conditions, arbitrary output is considered correct.
Definition 5.2 (Far-Sets(m)). Far-Sets is a communication problem between Alice and Bob:
• Alice’s Input: X ⊆M , with |X| = m/2 + 1.
• Bob’s Input: Y ⊆M , with |Y | = m/2 + 1.
• Promise: Either |X△Y | = 2 or |X ∩ Y | = 2.
• Output: 0 if |X△Y | = 2; 1 if |X ∩ Y | = 2.
Definition 5.3 (Exist-Far-Sets(m,k, ℓ)). Exist-Far-Sets is a communication problem be-
tween Alice and Bob:
• Alice’s Input: X = 〈X1, . . . ,Xk〉. Each Xi ⊆M .
• Bob’s Input: Y = 〈Y1, . . . , Yk〉. Each Yi ⊆M .
• Promise: X and Y are ℓ-compatible.
• Output: ∨i∈[k]Far-Sets(Xi, Yi). Observe that if the Exist-Far-Sets promise above is sat-
isfied, then by definition the Far-Sets promise is satisfied for all (Xi, Yi) (but not necessarily
vice versa — the Exist-Far-Sets promise is strictly stronger due to ℓ-sparsity).
Observe that Exist-Far-Sets is exactly the problem referenced in Lemma 5.2 (we state this
formally below). Therefore, the goal of this section is to lower bound the randomized communication
complexity of Exist-Far-Sets.
Corollary 5.3. Let C(m,k, ℓ) be such that every randomized communication protocol which solves
any given instance of Exist-Far-Sets(m,k, ℓ) with probability at least 2/3 has communication
complexity at least C(m,k, ℓ). Then every randomized communication protocol which solves any
given instance of Welfare-Maximization(m, 12 +
1
ℓ−1) with probability at least 2/3 has commu-
nication complexity at least C(m,k, ℓ).
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Our plan of attack will look very similar to Braverman’s lower bound on the randomized com-
munication complexity of Disjointness [Bra12].
5.2. Information Theory Preliminaries
Here, we provide some basic facts about information theory and information complexity. These are
the standard preliminaries one would find in a paper on information complexity (e.g. [BGPW13]).
Below, when we refer to a distribution µ, we use µ(ω) to denote the probability that ω is sampled
from µ. All logarithms taken in this section are base-2. Also for this section, all distributions
and random variables are supported on a finite set Ω. If µ(ω) = 0 for some ω ∈ Ω, we let
0 · log2(1/0) := limx→0 x · log2(1/x) = 0.
Definition 5.1 (Entropy). Let µ be a probability distribution over a finite set Ω. The (Shannon)
entropy of µ, denoted by H(µ), is defined as H(µ) :=
∑
ω∈Ω µ(ω) log(
1
µ(ω) ). If A is a random
variable distributed according to µA, we also write H(A) := H(µA).
Definition 5.2 (Conditional Entropy). Let A and B be two random variables supported on a
finite set Ω. Then the conditional entropy of A, conditioned on B is H(A|B) := ∑b∈Ω Pr[B =
b] ·H(A|B = b).11
Observe that as H(·) is a strictly concave function, H(A|B) ≤ H(A) for all B (with equality iff
A and B are independent).
Fact 5.4. H(A,B) = H(A)+H(B|A). Here, H(A,B) denotes the entropy of the random variable
(A,B).
Fact 5.4 above intuitively says that the entropy of a tuple of random variables is equal to the
entropy of the first, plus the entropy of the second conditioned on the first. Note that if A and B
are independent, then the joint entropy H(A,B) = H(A) +H(B).
Definition 5.3 (Mutual Information). For two random variables A,B, the mutual information
between A and B, denoted by I(A;B) is: I(A;B) := H(A)−H(A|B) = H(B)−H(B|A).
Definition 5.4 (Conditional Mutual Information). For three random variables A,B,C, the mu-
tual information between A and B, conditioned on C is denoted by I(A;B|C), and I(A;B|C) :=∑
c∈Ω Pr[C = c] · I(A|C = c;B|C = c).
Fact 5.5 (Chain Rule). Let A,B,C,D be random variables. Then I(A,B;C|D) = I(A;C|D) +
I(B;C|A,D).
Fact 5.5 above intuitively says that the information learned about (A,B) from C (conditioned
on D) can be broken down into the information learned about A from C (conditioned on D), plus
the information learned about B from C (now conditioned on A in addition to D).
Definition 5.5 (KL Divergence). We denote by D(A||B) the Kullback-Leibler Divergence between
A and B, which is defined as D(A||B) :=∑ω∈Ω Pr[A = ω] · log Pr[A=ω]Pr[B=ω] .
Fact 5.6. For any random variables A,B,C, I(A;B|C) = Eb,c[D(Abc||Ac)]. Here, Abc denotes the
random variable A conditioned on B = b, C = c, and Ac denotes the random variable A conditioned
on C = c.
11To be clear, by H(A|B = b) we mean the entropy of the random variable A, when drawn conditioned on the
event B = b.
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Fact 5.7 (Pinsker’s Inequality). For any pair of random variables A,B of finite support, ||P−Q||1 ≤√
2D(P ||Q). Here, ||P −Q||1 :=
∑
ω∈Ω |Pr[P = ω]− Pr[Q = ω]|.
Definition 5.6 (Information Complexity). The (internal) Information Complexity of a commu-
nication protocol π with respect to a distribution µ over pairs (X,Y ) of inputs is defined as
follows. Let Π(X,Y ) denote the random variable which is the transcript produced when Alice
and Bob participate in protocol π with inputs (X,Y ), when (X,Y ) are drawn from µ. Then
ICµ(π) := I(Π(X,Y );Y |X) + I(Π(X,Y );X|Y ).
Above, the “transcript” refers to all communication between Alice and Bob (including the order
bits were sent, who sent them, etc., and including any public randomness) when participating in
protocol π. In particular, it is always possible to glean the output produced by π from viewing the
transcript (but possibly additional information). Informally, the Information Complexity captures
the amount of information Alice learns about Bob’s input from participating in π (given that she
already knows her own input, the public randomness, and that their joint input is drawn from µ),
plus what Bob learns about Alice’s input. Intuitively, it should be impossible for a protocol to
convey C bits of information without C bits of communication. Indeed, this is the case:
Lemma 5.8 ([BR11b]). For any distribution µ and protocol π, ICµ(π) ≤ CC(π) (where CC(π)
denotes the worst-case number of bits communicated during protocol π on any input).
We conclude with a few more basic facts about communication protocols. Lemma 5.9 below
captures one key difference between communication protocols and algorithms with access to the
entire input. Lemma 5.9 below refers to private randomness, which are random bits which are
known only to Alice (but not Bob) and vice versa. Such bits are also not counted towards the
communication cost of the protocol (unless Alice wishes to share her private randomness with
Bob).
Lemma 5.9. Let Pπ(·, ·, ·) be a function where Pπ(z,X, Y ) denotes the probability that Alice with
input X and Bob with input Y produce transcript z when participating in a protocol π over the
randomness of any private randomness used (as public randomness is already accounted for in the
transcript). Then there exist functions Qπ(·, ·) and Rπ(·, ·) such that Pπ(z,X, Y ) = Qπ(z,X) ·
Rπ(z, Y ).
The proof of Lemma 5.9 is straightforward. Essentially, Qπ(z,X) is the probability that Alice
doesn’t deviate from transcript z with input X, conditioned on Bob communicating according to
transcript z so far. Similarly, Rπ(z, Y ) denotes the probability that Bob doesn’t deviate from
transcript z with input Y , conditioned on Alice communicating according to transcript z so far.
These probabilities are well-defined because Alice must choose her future messages based only on
the transcript so far (including the public randomness) and her input X (and Bob’s must be only
on the messages so far and Y ), as well as her private randomness. Once confirming that these
probabilities are well-defined, it is easy to see that indeed Pπ(z,X, Y ) = Qπ(z,X) · Rπ(z, Y ).
Finally, the lemma below states that lower bounds on the information complexity of any protocol
that only uses private randomness also lower bound the information complexity of any protocol
which uses public randomness. This initially may seem counterintuitive, since the opposite is true
for communication. Both simple claims below have “approximate” versions in the other directions
(discussed in the cited references), but we only use the easy directions.
Lemma 5.10 (Folklore, see [New91, BG14, BBK+16]). Let π be a protocol, and µ be a distribution
over inputs. Then:
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• If π uses private randomness, there exists a protocol π′ using public randomness with exactly
the same output as π, and CC(π′) ≤ CC(π). But maybe ICµ(π′)≫ ICµ(π).
• If π uses public randomness, there exists a protocol π′ using private randomness with exactly
the same output as π, and ICµ(π
′) ≤ ICµ(π). But maybe CC(π′)≫ CC(π).
Both claims in Lemma 5.10 follow by simple reductions. For the first bullet, simply use all odd
bits of the public randomness string as private randomness for Alice, and all even bits of the public
randomness string as private randomness for Bob. Then the output of the protocol is identical,
and the communication has not changed. However, Bob now knows Alice’s private randomness,
so the protcol may reveal significantly more information than previously (one example to have in
mind is that perhaps the protocol has Alice output one uniformly random bit of her input. With
private randomness, Bob learns very little about Alice’s input upon seeing the bit. With public
randomness, Bob learns exactly one bit of Alice’s input). For the second bullet, simply use Alice’s
private randomness as the public randomness. That is, whenever the protocol requests random bits,
Alice outputs these bits from her private random string. These bits are completely independent
of her input, and therefore reveal no additional information. However, the communication might
become enormous, as the randomness is now being directly communicated, and counts towards the
communication cost. To use Lemma 5.10, our lower bounds proceed by first lower bounding the
information complexity of Exist-Far-Sets with private randomness, using Lemma 5.10 to lower
bound the information complexity of Exist-Far-Sets with public randomness, using Lemma 5.8
to lower bound the communication complexity of Exist-Far-Sets with public randomness (if
desired, we could then use Lemma 5.10 to further lower bound the communication complexity of
Exist-Far-Sets with private randomness). The point is just that exponential communication is
required with either public or private randomness.
5.3. From Exist-Far-Sets to Far-Sets
In this section, we show how to lower bound the randomized communication complexity of Exist-
Far-Sets, provided we have any lower bound on the information complexity of (certain instances
of) Far-Sets. This section is analogous to Section 7.2 of [Bra12], but we repeat the approach here
in order to properly introduce these ideas to the AGT community.12 To get started, we need some
additional notation for promise problems.
Definition 5.7 (Promise problem). Let f be some function mapping {0, 1}m × {0, 1}m → {0, 1},
and let P ⊆ {0, 1}m ×{0, 1}m. Then the communication problem solving f under promise P refers
to the communication problem which requires Alice with input A and Bob with input B to output
f(A,B) whenever (A,B) ∈ P (and they may provide arbitrary output otherwise).
Definition 5.8 (b-compatible inputs). Say that an input (X,Y ) is b-compatible with respect to f
and P if (X,Y ) ∈ P and f(X,Y ) = b.
Definition 5.9 ((k, z)-safe distributions). Say that a distribution µ over {0, 1}m × {0, 1}m and
promise P ⊆ {0, 1}m × {0, 1}m are (k, z)-safe with respect to promise P ∗ ⊆ ({0, 1}m ×{0, 1}m)k if
for all j ∈ [k], and all (Xj , Yj) ∈ P , the probability that 〈(X1, Y1), . . . , (Xk, Yk)〉 ∈ P ∗ is at least z,
when (Xi, Yi) are drawn i.i.d. from µ for all i 6= j.
12Also, because of the additional promise of Exist-Far-Sets, we are unfortunately unaware of prior work which
we can cite as a black-box. But the proof below really follows from exactly the same ideas as [Bra12] after accounting
for the promise.
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Below is the main tool from information complexity that we’ll use, which provides a method for
proving communication lower bounds for k-dimensional communication problems via information
complexity lower bounds on a related 1-dimensional problem (plus some technical assumptions to
handle the promises).
Theorem 5.11 (follows from [Bra12]). Let f be some function mapping {0, 1}m×{0, 1}m → {0, 1},
and let P ⊆ {0, 1}m × {0, 1}m be some promised set of inputs. Let F ∗ be defined so that
F ∗((X1, . . . ,Xk), (Y1, . . . , Yk)) =
∨
i∈k
f(Xi, Yi).
Let also P ∗ ⊆ ({0, 1}m×{0, 1}m)k be some promised set of inputs such that P ∗ ⊆ P k (that is, every
coordinate of an element of P ∗ is in P ).
Let also µ be any distribution over inputs that are 0-compatible with respect to f and P . Let
also µ and P be (k, z)-safe with respect to P ∗.
Then, if any protocol π that solves f under promise P with probability at least q has ICµ(π) ≥ c,
any randomized protocol π∗ that solves F ∗ under promise P ∗ with probability at least q/z has
CC(π∗) ≥ kc.
Proof. We use exactly the same reduction proposed in Section 7.2 of [Bra12] forDisjointness. The
analysis just requires a little extra work to accommodate the promises. Assume for contradiction
that there exists a randomized protocol π∗ that solves F ∗ under promise P ∗ with probability at
least q/z and CC(π∗) < kc. We prove the contrapositive of the theorem statement by providing a
randomized protocol π that solves f under promise P with probability at least q, with ICµ(π) < c.
Here is the reduction (recall that π∗ is the assumed protocol for F ∗ under promise P ∗, and we will
use π to refer to the designed protocol):
• Alice and Bob are given input (X,Y ) ∈ P .
• Alice and Bob use the shared randomness to select an i ∈ [k] uniformly at random. Let
Xi := X and Yi := Y .
• Alice and Bob use shared randomness to publicly sample X1, . . . ,Xi−1 i.i.d. from µX , and
Yi+1, . . . , Yk i.i.d. from µY . Here, µX denotes the marginal of µ restricted to X (ditto for µY ).
• Alice privately samples Xj from µX |Yj for all j > i. That is, Alice samples Xj from µX ,
conditioned on Yj . Bob privately samples Yj from µY |Xj for all j < i.
• Alice and Bob run protocol π∗ on input (X1, . . . ,Xk;Y1, . . . , Yk) (refer to this as (X ,Y) for
notational simplicity) and output the answer.
Let’s first observe the following about the correctness of the above protocol: First, maybe
(X ,Y) /∈ P ∗. In this case, we have no guarantees about the success of the protocol (because π∗
may behave arbitrarily). However, because (µ, P ) are (k, z)-safe with respect to P ∗, we know that
for all (X,Y ), the resulting (X ,Y) is in P ∗ with probability at least z.
Moreover, observe that, conditioned on (X ,Y) ∈ P ∗, protocol π∗ is correct with probability at
least q/z by definition. Finally, we observe that because µ is 0-compatible with respect to f and
P , f(Xj , Yj) = 0 for all j 6= i. Therefore, f(X,Y ) =
∨k
j=1 f(Xj, Yj) = F
∗(X ,Y). So whenever
protocol π∗ is correct on (X ,Y), our protocol π is correct on (X,Y ). At this point, we may
conclude that our protocol is correct with probability at least z · q/z = q. The remaining
step is to compute its information complexity with respect to µ.
First, we wish to point out that indeed the communication complexity of π can be quite high.
Indeed, it is blowing up what should be a one-dimensional problem into a k-dimensional problem
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before solving it. Intuitvely, though, we’d like to say that only a 1/k-fraction of this communication
is actually being used to solve our original instance. It’s hard to make this a formal statement, but
this intuition can be made formal if we look at information complexity instead: In expectation,
only a 1/k-fraction of the information our protocol learns is relevant to the original instance.
Below, recall that I(P ;Q) denotes the mutual information of random variables P and Q and
I(P ;Q | R) denotes the expected mutual information of P and Q conditioned on R. We will use
Π(X,Y ) to denote the random variable corresponding to the transcript of the protocol π, when
(X,Y ) are drawn from µ, and will use Π∗(X ,Y) to denote the random variable corresponding to
the transcript of π∗ when inputs (X ,Y) are drawn from µk. Let’s begin by writing the information
the information that Alice learns about Y given X from our protocol π:
I(Π(X,Y );Y | X) = I(Π∗(X ,Y);Y | i,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,X,Xi+1, . . . ,Xk, Yi+1, . . . , Yk).
Let’s parse the above statement before proceeding. It is essentially saying that what Alice
learns about Y from Π(X,Y ) given that she already knows X is exactly the same as what she
learns from the random variable Π(X ,Y) (because these random variables are identical), except
now Alice already knows X and Yi+1, . . . , Yk (because they were sampled publicly). Now we can
perform some manipulations based on the facts from Section 5.2. For the first step, we’ll separate
out the conditioning on i, as i is independent of all other random variables (we’ll also start replacing
X1, . . . ,Xi−1,X,Xi+1, . . . ,Xk with X to save space):
I(Π∗(X ,Y);Y |i,X , Yi+1, . . . , Yk) =
k∑
i=1
1
k
· I(Π∗(X ,Y);Y |X , Yi+1, . . . , Yk)
=
1
k
·
k∑
i=1
I(Π∗(X ,Y);Yi|X , Yi+1, . . . , Yk).
Above, the second equality is simply relabeling (X,Y ) as (Xi, Yi), as they are identically dis-
tributed and independent of all other random variables. From here, we can repeatedly apply the
chain rule. Specifically, recall that the chain rule implies that
I(Π∗(X ,Y);Yk|X ) + I(Π∗(X ,Y);Yk−1|X , Yk) = I(Π∗(X ,Y);Yk−1, Yk|X ).
More generally, for any i,
I(Π∗(X ,Y);Yi, . . . , Yk|X ) + I(Π∗(X ,Y);Yi−1|X , Yi, . . . , Yk) = I(Π∗(X ,Y);Yi−1, . . . , Yk|X ).
As such, we get that:
1
k
·
k∑
i=1
I(Π∗(X ,Y);Yi | X , Yi+1, . . . , Yk) = 1
k
· I(Π∗(X ,Y);Y | X ).
We may now conclude that I(Π;Y |X) = 1k ·I(Π∗(X ,Y);Y|X ). The exact same argument swapping
the roles of X and Y yields that I(Π(X,Y );X | Y ) = 1k · I(Π∗(X ,Y);X | Y). These are the key
claims: even though the communication of the protocol π may be huge, the information complexity
is small. In a formal sense, only a 1/k fraction of the information conveyed through throughout
protocol π is conveyed about the specific indices where we placed (X,Y ). From here, we now
conclude:
ICµ(π) = I(Π(X,Y );X | Y ) + I(Π(X,Y );Y | X) = 1
k
(I(Π∗(X ,Y);X | Y) + I(Π∗(X ,Y);Y | X ))
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=
1
k
ICµk(π
∗) ≤ 1
k
CC(Π).
Recall that we assumed for for contradiction that CC(Π) < ck, and therefore we would conclude
that ICµ(π) < c. The contrapositive proves the theorem statement.
5.4. The Information Complexity of Far-Sets
Theorem 5.11 reduces our search for a communication lower bound on Exist-Far-Sets to a search
for an information complexity lower bound on Far-Sets. In this section, we prove such a bound.
To get started, let’s first define the distribution µ for which we’ll prove our information complexity
lower bound:
Definition 5.4. Let µ denote the uniform distribution over all pairs of sets (X,Y ) of size m2 + 1
such that |X△Y | = 2.
Recall that intuitively, the goal of this section is to prove that any protocol that solves Far-Sets
correctly with probability bounded away from 1/2 on all instances must result in Alice learning
some information about Y (or Bob learning some information about X) when this protocol is run
on instances (X,Y ) drawn from µ. Note that it is crucial to assume that the protocol is correct
on all instances, and not just those drawn from µ (as all instances drawn from µ can be correctly
answered by communicating nothing and outputting 0).
Theorem 5.12. Let π be a randomized protocol (with public or private randomness) that solves
Far-Sets correctly with probability greater than 0.8 on every input (that satisfies the promise).
Then ICµ(π) >
1
4m5
.
Proof. For simplicity of notation, assume that m is a multiple of 4 (if not, it is just an issue of being
more careful with indices). For further simplicity of notation, let n = m/2. The main idea of the
proof is to derive a contradiction from the following two arguments. First, if ICµ(π) is negligible,
then there exists a “chain” of sets S1, . . . , Sn such that |S1 ∩ Sn| = 2; and for all i, |Si△Si+1| = 2,
Alice with input Si must not be able to effectively distinguish between when Bob has Si+1 or Si−1
just from the transcript of π.
On the other hand, if π solves Far-Sets on every instance (that satisfies the promise), then
when Alice has input S1, Alice must be able to effectively distinguish between when Bob has S2
and Sn just from the transcript of π (because the correct output is different in these two cases,
and the distribution of transcripts must therefore be noticeably different). Due to the nature of
communication protocols, these two claims will turn out to be contradictory. These are the key
steps in the proof approach; we now begin formally. In the lemma statement below, for two random
variables X,Y with finite support we let ||X − Y ||1 :=
∑
z |Pr[X = z]− Pr[Y = z]|.
Proposition 5.13. Let π be any private-randomness protocol that correctly solves Far-Sets on
every instance (satisfying the promise) with probability at least 0.8. Then no chain of sets S1, . . . , Sn
satisfies the following properties simultaneously:
• |Si| = m/2 + 1 for all i.
• |S1 ∩ Sn| = 2 and for all 1 ≤ i < n, |Si△Si+1| = 2.
• For all odd 1 < i < n, ||Π(Si, Si−1)−Π(Si, Si+1)||1 ≤ 1/m2.
• For all even 1 < i < n, ||Π(Si−1, Si)−Π(Si+1, Si)||1 ≤ 1/m2.
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Proof. Assume for contradiction that such a chain of sets exists. By Lemma 5.9, there exist
functions P (·, ·) and Q(·, ·) such that Pr[Π(X,Y ) = z] = P (z,X) ·Q(z, Y ). We thus have (simply
by expanding the bottom two hypotheses).∑
z
|P (z, Si) · (Q(z, Si−1)−Q(z, Si+1))| ≤ 1
m2
(i odd);
∑
z
|Q(z, Si) · (P (z, Si−1)− P (z, Si+1))| ≤ 1
m2
(i even).
For notational simplicity for the remainder of the proof, we will denote by ai(z) := P (z, Si)
when i is even, and ai(z) := Q(z, Si) when i is odd. Observe that the above equations are then
simply: ∑
z
|ai(z)(ai−1(z)− ai+1(z))| ≤ 1
m2
, 1 < i < n.
Finally, let s(z) :=
∑
1<i<n |ai(z)(ai−1(z)− ai+1(z))|. The following lemma bounds a1(z)(a2(z) −
an(z)) in terms of s(z). Recall that a1(z) · a2(z) = Pr[Π(S1, S2) = z] and a1(z) · an(z) :=
Pr[Π(S1, Sn) = z]. So the lemma is bounding some term having to do with the difference between
Π(S1, S2) and Π(S1, Sn) in terms of the sums of differences between Π(Si, Si−1) and Π(Si, Si+1).
Lemma 5.14. For all z, we have a1(z)(a2(z)− an(z)) ≤ ms(z).
Proof. To ease notational burden through this proof, we will drop the parameter z (since the
proof is independent of z). In particular, we will use terms ai throughout the proof and s, where
s :=
∑
1<i<n |ai · (ai−1 − ai+1)|. Observe that ai(ai−1 − ai+1) ≤ s for all i.
If a1a2 ≤ ms, then the lemma statement follows trivially, as a1, an ≥ 0. So now consider when
that a1a2 > ms. In this case, we will define new b1, . . . , bn for which bi ≤ ai for all i, and analyze
these instead.
To this end, define b1 = a1, b2 = a2, and for 2 < i ≤ n define bi := bi−2 − s/bi−1. Observe that
the bis satisfy the following equality (to see this, substitute bi−1 − s/bi for bi+1):
bibi+1 = bibi−1 − s. (1)
Since b1b2 = a1a2 > ms, this means that for all i < n we have bibi+1 > (m− i+ 1)s > 0 (recall
that n = m2 ). Since b1 and b2 are strictly positive, we conclude that all bi are strictly positive as well.
Now, we claim that bi ≤ ai for all i. Indeed, this is true for i = 1, 2. We now prove this by induction
for i > 2. Assume for inductive hypothesis that bj ≤ aj. Then bj+1 = bj−1− sbj ≤ aj−1−
s
aj
≤ aj+1.
The last step follows from the equation aj(aj−1 − aj+1) ≤ s.
Now, we wish to prove further properties of the bis towards our end goal. We show the following
inequality by induction:
b1(b2 − b2i) ≤ s
(
m
m− 1 +
m
m− 3 + · · · +
m
m− (2i − 3)
)
. (2)
Proof of Equation 2. Observe first for i = 2 that we have:
b1(b2 − b4) = b1
(
b2 −
(
b2 − s
b3
))
=
b1
b3
· s = s · b1
b1 − sb2
= s · b1b2
b1b2 − s = s ·
a1a2
a1a2 − s .
Now, a1a2a1a2−s is decreasing in a1a2, and we assumed already that a1a2 > ms, so we have
b1(b2 − b4) = s · a1a2
a1a2 − s < s ·
ms
ms− s = s ·
m
m− 1 .
17
This proves the base case (i = 2). Now assume for inductive hypothesis that the inequality holds
for i− 1. We then have:
b1(b2 − b2i) = b1(b2 − b2(i−1)) + b1(b2(i−1) − b2i) = b1(b2 − b2(i−1)) + b1 ·
s
b2i−1
.
The last step here follows from Equation 1. From here we continue with:
b1(b2 − b2(i−1)) + b1 ·
s
b2i−1
= b1(b2 − b2(i−1)) + b1 ·
s
b2i−3 − sb2i−2
= b1(b2 − b2(i−1)) + b1 ·
b2i−2s
b2i−3b2i−2 − s .
From here, we now apply Equation (1) to the term in the denominator 2i − 4 times. That is, we
successively replace bjbj+1 with bjbj−1 − s, 2i− 4 times. This leaves us with:
b1(b2 − b2i) = b1(b2 − b2(i−1)) + b1 ·
b2i−2s
b1b2 − (2i− 3)s . (3)
Now, it is easy to see from the definition of bis that for all j, bj+2 ≤ bj. As such, we also have
b2i−2 ≤ b2. Finally, note that the denominator (b1b2 − (2i − 3)s) is positive (since we are in the
case that b1b2 = a1a2 > ms), so we can now write:
b1(b2 − b2i) ≤ b1(b2 − b2(i−1)) + s ·
b1b2
b1b2 − (2i − 3)s ≤ b1(b2 − b2(i−1)) + s ·
ms
ms− (2i − 3)s
≤ s
(
m
m− 1 +
m
m− 3 + · · ·+
m
m− (2i − 3)
)
.
The penultimate step above follows from the fact that b1b2b1b2−(2i−3)s decreasing in b1b2 and we have
assumed that b1b2 > ms. The last step follows by the inductive hypothesis. This completes the
proof of Equation (2).
Now we return to the proof of Lemma 5.14 with Equation (2) in hand. Now, since an ≥ bn, we
have:
a1(a2 − an) = b1(b2 − an) ≤ b1(b2 − bn) ≤ ms
(
1
m− 1 +
1
m− 3 + · · ·+
1
m− (m2 − 3)
)
.
In the right-most term, observe that there are m/4− 1 terms in the sum, each of which are at
most 2/m. As such, the total sum of these terms is ≤ 1. Therefore, the right-hand-side above is at
most ms, and a1(a2 − an) ≤ ms, as desired. This concludes the proof of Lemma 5.14.
Now, we return to the proof of Proposition 5.13. Recall that the purpose of Lemma 5.14 is
to claim that the random variables Π(S1, S2) and Π(S1, Sn) are not that different (which would
contradict that π is correct with probability at least 0.8 on both (S1, S2) and (S1, Sn)). Observe
by Lemma 5.14 that:
∑
z,a2(z)≥an(z)
a1(z) (a2(z) − an(z)) ≤ m

 ∑
z,a2(z)≥an(z)
s(z)

 ≤ m∑
z
s(z)
= m
n−1∑
i=2
∑
z
|ai(z)(ai−1(z)− ai+1(z))| ≤ m(n− 2)
m2
≤ 1
2
.
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Above, recall that n := m/2, and that we have assumed for contradiction that
∑
z |ai(z)(ai−1(z)−
ai+1(z)| ≤ 1/m2 for all i. (Recall that
∑
z |ai(z)(ai−1(z)− ai+1(z)| := ||Π(Si, Si−1)−Π(Si, Si+1)||1
when i is odd, or ||Π(Si−1, Si) − Π(Si+1, Si)||1 when i is even, both of which are assumed to be
≤ 1/m2 in the proposition statement.)
Invoking that a1(z)a2(z) = Pr[Π(S1, S2) = z], and a1(z)an(z) = Pr[Π(S1, Sn) = z], we further
conclude that: ∑
z,Pr[Π(S1,S2)=z]≥Pr[Π(S1,Sn)=z]
|Pr[Π(S1, S2) = z]− Pr[Π(S1, Sn) = z]|
=
∑
z,a2(z)≥an(z)
a1(z)(a2(z)− an(z)) ≤ 1
2
.
But note that
∑
z Pr[Π(S1, S2) = z] =
∑
z Pr[Π(S1, Sn) = z] = 1, which means that:∑
z,Pr[Π(S1,S2)=z]≥Pr[Π(S1,Sn)=z]
|Pr[Π(S1, S2) = z]− Pr[Π(S1, Sn) = z]|
=
∑
z,Pr[Π(S1,S2)=z]<Pr[Π(S1,Sn)=z]
|Pr[Π(S1, S2) = z]− Pr[Π(S1, Sn) = z]|,
so in fact both sums are ≤ 1/2, and we may now conclude that:
||Π(S1, S2)−Π(S1, Sn)||1 ≤ 1. (4)
Now, we are ready to wrap up the proof of Proposition 5.13, as Equation 4 asserts that the
random variables Π(S1, S2) and Π(S1, Sn) are too similar in order for protocol π to be correct with
probability at least 0.8 on both (S1, S2) and also (S1, Sn).
Indeed, let Zb be the set of transcripts that output b. Then because π is correct with probability
at least 0.8, Π(S1, Sn) assigns mass at least 0.8 to z ∈ Z1, and Π(S1, S2) assigns mass at most 0.2.
So terms in Z1 alone contribute at least 0.6 to the difference. In addition, Π(S1, Sn) assigns mass
at most 0.2 to z ∈ Z0, and Π(S1, S−2) assigns mass at least 0.8. So terms in Z0 contribute at least
0.6 to the difference. Therefore, because π is correct, we must have ||Π(S1, S2)−Π(S1, Sn)||1 ≥ 1.2,
contradicting our conclusion above.
This concludes the proof of Proposition 5.13. To recap: we first showed how to relate the
statistical difference between Π(S1, S2) and Π(S1, Sn) to the statistical distance between adjacent
pairs Π(Si, Si+1) and Π(Si+2, Si+1) (Lemma 5.14). Lemma 5.14 required a decent amount of math,
the bulk of which is in proving Equation (2). With Lemma 5.14, we then obtained a contradiction:
the statistical difference between Π(S1, S2) and Π(S1, Sn) cannot be small if π is to possibly be
correct on both (S1, S2) and (S1, Sn), because the answers must be different with good probability.
Proposition 5.13 claims that no chains of the proposed form can exist for any private-randomness
protocol which solves all instances of Far-Sets with probability 0.8. Now we will claim that any
protocol which has low information complexity with respect to µ must have some chain of the
proposed form. To this end, we first give a few definitions:
Definition 5.5. Let n = m2 as before.
• A link is an ordered pair (X,Y ) of sets of size n+ 1 such that |X△Y | = 2.
• A chain is a sequence of sets T1, . . . , Tn such that (Ti, Ti+1) is a link for 1 ≤ i < n, and
|T1 ∩ Tn| = 2.
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• Given a link (X,Y ), recall that Π(X,Y ) is the random variable denoting the transcript when
π is run on input (X,Y ). Further define Π(X, ?) to be the random variable which first samples
a uniformly random Y such that (X,Y ) is a link (note that this is simply sampling a uniformly
random element of X to remove, and a uniformly random element /∈ X to add), and then
samples Π(X,Y ). Define Π(?, Y ) similarly.
• A link (X,Y ) is broken if D(Π(X,Y ) ‖ Π(X, ?)) > 1
8m4
or if D(Π(X,Y ) ‖ Π(?, Y )) > 1
8m4
.
Here, D(· ‖ ·) represents Kullback-Leibler divergence from Definition 5.5.
• A chain T1, . . . , Tn is broken if for some odd i, (Ti, Ti+1) or (Ti, Ti−1) is a broken link. These
n− 1 links are the chain’s structural links.
Proposition 5.15. Let π be a protocol with ICµ(π) ≤ 18m4N . Then at most a 1/N fraction of links
are broken.
Proof. Let’s first compute I(Π(X,Y );X|Y ) when (X,Y ) are drawn from µ. In order to draw from
µ, we may first draw X uniformly at random from all sets of size n+1, and then draw Y uniformly
at random among all sets of size n + 1 with |X△Y | = 2 (note that there are (n + 1)(n − 1) such
sets: pick an element in X to kick out and an element /∈ X to add). So we get that:
I(Π(X,Y );X | Y ) = 1( m
n+1
) ∑
T⊆M
|T |=n+1
I(Π(X,Y );X | Y = T )
=
1( m
n+1
) ∑
T⊆M
|T |=n+1
∑
S, (S,T ) is a link
1
(n+ 1)(n − 1)D(Π(S, T ) ‖ Π(?, T )).
The first step above is just expanding the definition of conditional mutual information. The
second step requires some further explanation. First, note that the number of S such that (S, T ) is
a link is (n+1)(n− 1) (one of the n+1 elements of T needs to be kicked out and one of the n− 1
elements of T needs to be put in to form S), and each of these sets are equally likely to be drawn
from µ. The second step is again just unraveling the definition of mutual information via Fact 5.6.
Now, the above sum can be written to directly sum over all links. That is:
I(Π(X,Y );X | Y ) = 1( m
n+1
) · (n+ 1)(n − 1) ·
∑
links (S,T )
D(Π(S, T )||Π(?, T )).
Identical math concludes that I(Π(X,Y );Y | X) = 1
( mn+1)·(n+1)(n−1)
·∑links (S,T )D(Π(S, T )||Π(S, ?)).
This means that:
ICµ(π) =
1( m
n+1
) · (n+ 1)(n − 1)D(Π(S, T ) ‖ Π(?, T )) +D(Π(S, T ) ‖ Π(S, ?)). (5)
Observe that this is simply the average over all links of D(Π(S, T ) ‖ Π(?, T )) + D(Π(S, T ) ‖
Π(S, ?)). So if a 1/N fraction of all links are broken, then the average of this quantity over all links
is at least 1
8m4N
, meaning that ICµ(π) ≥ 18m4N .
Now, we claim that if most links are not broken, there must exist an entire chain which is not
broken.
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Lemma 5.16. If fewer than 2m links are broken, there exists an unbroken chain.
Proof. We first claim that the number of chains is m!2 . Indeed, consider the structure of a chain
T1, . . . , Tn. Observe that there are exactly two items that persist in ∩iTi. Moreover, each Ti adds a
unique element to Ti−1 (that previously wasn’t added) and removes another one (which previously
wasn’t removed). So if we order the m elements so that the first two elements are in ∩iTi, and
the next n − 1 elements are added in T2, T3, . . . , Tn, and the next n − 1 elements are removed in
T2, . . . , Tn, this defines a chain. The chain defined is invariant under flipping the order of the first
two elements, but modulo this, each ordering defines a unique chain.
As counted previously, the total number of links is
( m
n+1
)
(n− 1)(n+ 1): for a link (X,Y ) there
are
( m
n+1
)
choices for X and (n − 1)(n + 1) choices for Y conditioned on this. Each chain consists
of n− 1 structural links, so the number of pairs (C, L) such that L is a link in chain C is m!2 (n− 1).
By symmetry, every link is a structural link of the same number of chains, so for a given link, the
number of chains which contain it as a structural link is:
m!(n− 1)
2
(
m
n+1
)
(n− 1)(n + 1) =
m!
2
(
m
n+1
)
(n+ 1)
.
Thus, for all m!2 chains to be broken, there must be at least m!/2 pairs (C, L) such that C is a
chain and L is a broken structured link of C. By the above counting, this means there must be at
least
( m
n+1
)
(n + 1) broken links. But this is 1n−1 =
1
m/2−1 > 2/m fraction of all of the links. So if
fewer than this are broken, there must exist an unbroken chain.
Now, we want to claim that an unbroken chain exactly satisfies the hypotheses of Proposi-
tion 5.13. This is the last step in wrapping up the proof of Theorem 5.12.
Lemma 5.17. Let S1, . . . , Sn be an unbroken chain. Then for all odd 1 < i < n, ||Π(Si, Si−1) −
Π(Si, Si+1)||1 ≤ 1/m2, and for all even 1 < i < n, ||Π(Si−1, Si)−Π(Si+1, Si)||1 ≤ 1/m2.
Proof. Because the chain is unbroken, we get that for all odd i > 1, D(Π(Si, Si+1 ‖ Π(Si, ?)) and
D(Π(Si, Si−1) ‖ Π(Si, ?)) are both at most 18m4 . Now, Pinsker’s inequality allows us to conclude that
||Π(Si, Si+1)−Π(Si, ?)||1 ≤
√
2
8m4 =
1
2m2 for all i, and also that ||Π(Si, Si+1)−Π(?, Si+1)||1 ≤ 12m2
for all i. By the triangle inequality, we therefore conclude that for odd i:
||Π(Si, Si+1)−Π(Si, Si−1)||1 ≤ 1/m2
And for even i:
||Π(Si+1, Si)−Π(Si−1, Si)||1 ≤ 1/m2.
Now, we are finally ready to conclude the proof of Theorem 5.12. We have two contradictory
lines of argument: on one hand, if π uses private randomness and is correct on every input with
probability at least 0.8, then Proposition 5.13 combined with Lemma 5.17 claims that no unbroken
chain can exist. However, Proposition 5.15 combined with Lemma 5.16 claims that if ICµ(π) <
1
4m5
,
then there is an unbroken chain. So no private-randomness protocol can simultaneously have
ICµ(π) <
1
4m5
and correctly solve Far-Sets on every input with probability at least 0.8. From
Lemma 5.10 it also follows that no protocol, whether making use of public randomness or not, can
simulatenously have ICµ(π) <
1
4m5
and correctly solve Far-Sets on every input with probability
at least 0.8.
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5.5. Wrapping everything up
Now, we can complete the proof of Theorem 5.1 by combining everything together. We first need to
combine Theorem 5.12 and Theorem 5.11 to conclude that randomized protocols for Exist-Far-
Sets require exponential communication.
Theorem 5.18. For all m, ℓ, k such that ℓ ≤ (1 − c) log3(m) for some constant c > 0 and k ∈
(m, exp( m
c
2 log3(m)
), any randomized protocol π that solves Exist-Far-Sets with probability at least
2/3 on all instances (which satisfy the promise) has CC(π) = Ω(k/m5).
Proof. We already have a distribution µ for which any protocol π solving Far-Sets with probability
at least 0.8 on all inputs has ICµ(π) >
1
4m5 . It is also clear that Exist-Far-Sets(X ,Y) =∨
i∈[k]Far-Sets(Xi, Yi). So we just need to check the details with respect to the promises. In
particular, we just need to see for what values of (k, z), µ is and the Far-Sets promise are (k, z)-
safe with respect to the Exist-Far-Sets promise.
Observe that conditions (1) and (2) of the Exist-Far-Sets promise are trivially satisfied.
So we just need to check conditions (3) and (4). Note that these conditions depend only on
Alice’s sets and, separately, Bob’s sets, and not on how Alice’s and Bob’s sets interact. Now,
the Exist-Far-Sets promise is invariant under permutations of M , and also under permuta-
tions of the indices (i.e. if (X1, Y1), . . . , (Xk, Yk) satisfy the Exist-Far-Sets promise, then so do
(Xσ(1), Yσ(1)), . . . , (Xσ(k), Yσ(k)) for any permutation σ from [k] to [k]). Therefore, we may treat
Alice as having i.i.d. subsets of M of size m2 + 1, and likewise with Bob. We are interested in
bounding the probability that Alice’s sets do not satisfy conditions (3) and (4); then, a simple
union bound will give us the probability that the Exist-Far-Sets promise is satisfied.
Lemma 5.19. Let X = 〈X1, . . . ,Xk〉 be drawn so that each Xi is an i.i.d. uniformly random set
of size m/2 + 1. For any x, let ℓ := log3(m) − log3(x), and let k ≤ e
x
2ℓ . Then with probability at
least 1− e−x/2 − ke−Ω(m), X is ℓ-sparse.
Proof. Consider the following roundabout way to draw Xi: first place each element of M in X
′
i
independently with probability 2/3. Then, if |X ′i| ≥ m/2 + 1, let Xi be a random subset of X ′i of
size m/2 + 1. If any |X ′i| < m/2 + 1, abort the entire process and consider it a failure. Observe
that Xi ⊆ X ′i.
For a fixed item j, and fixed set L of indices with |L| = ℓ, the probability that j ∈ ∪i∈LX ′i
is 1 − (1/3)ℓ. Because these events are independent, the probability that M ⊆ ∪i∈LX ′i is exactly
(1− (1/3)ℓ)m. Taking a union bound over all (kℓ) subsets we get that the probability the collection
is not ℓ-sparse, conditioned on not failing initially, is at most:(
k
ℓ
)(
1− 1/3ℓ
)m
≤ kℓexp
(−m
3ℓ
)
= exp (ℓ ln(k)− x) ≤ exp(−x/2).
Finally, observe that the expected number of items in each X ′i is 2m/3. So the probability that
a single X ′i fails to have m/2+1 elements is e
−Ω(m) by the Chernoff bound. Taking a union bound
over all k X ′is accounts for the additional ke
−Ω(m) term.
Lemma 5.20. Let X = 〈X1, . . . ,Xk〉 be drawn so that each Xi is an i.i.d. uniformly random set
of size m/2 + 1. Then with probability at least 1− e−k/3ℓ − e−Ω(m), for all sets T of |T | = ℓ, there
exists an Xi ⊇ T .
Proof. Let’s again consider the following roundabout way to draw Xi: first place each element of
M in X ′i independently with probability 1/3. Then if |X ′i| ≤ m/2+1, let Xi be a random superset
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of X ′i of size m/2 + 1. If any |X ′i| > m/2 + 1, abort the entire process and consider it a failure.
Observe that Xi ⊇ X ′i.
For a fixed set T of size ℓ, The probability that X ′i contains T is just 1/3
ℓ. So the probability
that no X ′i contains T is (1 − 1/3ℓ)k ≤ exp(−k/3ℓ). Again, the probability of failure is at most
ke−Ω(m), resulting in the lemma statement.
Now to wrap up, we observe that the probability that the Exist-Far-Sets promise is not
satisfied is at most 2(ke−Ω(m) + e−k/3
ℓ
+ e−x/2), where ℓ := log3(m) − log3(x) and k ≤ e
x
2ℓ . Here,
the factor of 2 comes from a union bound from the events that Alice’s sets fail condition (3) or (4)
and that Bob’s sets fail condiiton (3) or (4).
When x = mc, for any c < 1, we get that ℓ := (1 − c) log3(m), and k ≤ e
mc
2(1−c) log3(m) . As such,
ke−Ω(m) = o(1), e−x/2 = o(1), and furthermore e−k/3
ℓ
= o(1) as long as k = Ω(m).
Theorem 5.11 combined with Theorem 5.12 then implies that any protocol π for Exist-Far-
Sets which succeeds on all inputs (satisfying the promise) with probability at least 0.8/(1 − o(1))
has CC(π) ≥ k
4m5
. To replace 0.8/(1−o(1)) with 2/3 in the Theorem statement, observe that if we
had a protocol with success probability 2/3, we could repeat it independently a constant number
of times and take a majority to get a protocol with success probability 0.8/(1 − o(1)).
Proof of Theorem 5.1. The proof of Theorem 5.1 now follows immediately from Theorem 5.18 and
Corollary 5.3. In particular, by plugging in ℓ = log3(m)/3, we may take c = 2/3, and k =
4m5 ·e
√
m in Theorem 5.18 to conclude that any randomized protocol guaranteeing a (1/2+ 6log(m))-
approximation for Welfare-Maximization with probability at least 2/3 on all instances requires
communication Ω(e
√
m).
6. From XOS to Subadditive: The MPH Hierarchy
In this section, we explore the space between fractionally subadditive and subadditive functions via
the MPH hierarchy.
6.1. MPH Preliminaries
Let’s first review the definitions.
Definition 6.1 (Positive-Hypergraph [ABDR12]). A valuation function v(·) is PH-k if there exists
a non-negative set function w(·) such that for all S, v(S) =∑T⊆S,|T |≤kw(T ).
Observe that PH-1 functions are exactly additive functions.
Definition 6.2 (Maximum-over-Positive-Hypergraphs [FFI+15]). A valuation function v(·) is MPH-
k if there exists a collection F of PH-k valuation functions such that for all S, v(S) = maxf∈F{f(S)}.
Observe that MPH-1 functions are exactly fractionally subadditive (XOS) functions.
The next observation follows directly from the definitions.
Observation 6.1. Let v(·) be MPH-k. Then for every item set S, there exists a non-negative set
function wS(·) such that (i) v(S) =
∑
T⊆S wS(T ); (ii) v(S
′) ≥∑T⊆S′ wS(T ) for every S′ 6= S; and
(iii) wS(T ) = 0 for every set T of size |T | > k.
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Proof. By definition, v(·) is a maximum over PH-k functions. Let fS(·) be the PH-k function that
is the arg-maximizer at S, i.e., v(S) = fS(S); then clearly v(S
′) ≥ fS(S′) for every S′. Because
fS(·) is PH-k, by definition there exists a non-negative set function w(·) for which all conditions
are satisfied.
The following lemma lower-bounds the MPH level of a set function v(·) based on the ratio
between the sum of marginal contributions of the items to the grand bundle and the grand bundle’s
value.
Lemma 6.2. Let v(·) be any set function. Then v(·) is not MPH-k for k <
∑
j v(M)−v(M\{j})
v(M) .
Proof. Let k be the level of v(·) in the MPH hierarchy (i.e., v(·) is MPH-k). Then by Observation 6.1
there exists a non-negative set function w(·) such that (i) ∑T w(T ) = v(M); (ii) v(M \ {j}) ≥∑
T⊆M\{j}w(T ) for all j; and (iii) w(T ) = 0 for every T with |T | > k. Summing both sides of (ii)
over all items j yields:∑
j∈M
v(M \ {j}) ≥
∑
j
∑
T⊆M\{j}
w(T ) =
∑
T
w(T )(m − |T |) ≥
∑
T
w(T )(m− k) = v(M)(m− k).
Rearranging the inequality yields kv(M) ≥∑j v(M)− v(M \ {j}), as required.
[FFI+15] show that every monotone valuation function is MPH-m, and that there exist subad-
ditive functions that are not in MPH-k for any k < m/2. In the Appendix we show that this is
tight; i.e., that every monotone subadditive valuation function is MPH-⌈m2 ⌉ (Proposition A.1).
Clearly, for any k > 1, there exist MPH-k functions that are not complement-free (i.e., sub-
additive). Indeed, even MPH-2 functions exhibit complementarities. Since we are interested in
exploring the space of functions between XOS and subadditive, our results in this section will
be for “subadditive MPH-k” functions, which belong to both classes simultaneously. The extra
subadditive assumption is necessary for our results (Proposition 6.12).
6.2. Our Results for Subadditive MPH-k
A preliminary question to address is: what is the MPH level of the subadditive functions constructed
in Section 3? It turns out to be quite high:
Proposition 6.3. For all S, ℓ, such that f ℓS(·) is well-defined, f ℓS(·) is not MPH-k for k < m/ℓ.
Proof. For every item j, f ℓS(M)−f ℓS(M \{j}) ≥ 1, and f ℓS(M) = ℓ. Applying Lemma 6.2 completes
the proof.
Proposition 6.3 raises the possibility to improve upon the 1/2-approximation ratio for subaddi-
tive functions which reside in lower MPH levels. The main result of this section is a (12 +Ω(
1
log k ))-
approximation in poly(m) communication for Welfare-Maximization when Alice and Bob have
valuations that are both subadditive and MPH-k. This approximation guarantee is tight for suffi-
ciently large k by direct application of our previous bounds.
Our main technical contribution in this section is an oblivious rounding protocol for the configu-
ration LP when two bidders both have subadditive MPH-k valuations. The protocol’s performance
gradually degrades with the level k, starting from 0.625 for k = 2 (Section 6.4) and behaving
like 12 + Ω(
1
log k ) in general (Section 6.5). An alternative and simpler protocol with guarantee
1
2 + Ω(
1
logm) was developed independently for subadditive valuations by Dobzinski (which makes
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use of the fact that XOS valuations pointwise 1/Hm-approximate subadditive functions.
13 It is an
interesting open question to determine whether the simpler version can be extended to subadditive
MPH-k valuations with the 12 + Ω(
1
log k ) guarantee (for instance, by proving that XOS valuations
pointwise 1/Hk-approximate subadditive MPH-k functions. Note, however, that the “subadditive”
is necessary for this claim to possibly be true).
We remark that the obliviousness of the protocol is known to be without loss, by the results
of [FFT16]: since the class of MPH-k valuations is closed under convex combinations, by [FFT16]
there exists an oblivious rounding scheme that achieves an approximation guarantee matching the
integrality gap of the LP. In Section 6.6 we show the matching integrality gap of 12 + Ω(
1
log k ) for
sufficiently large k.We also remark that our rounding-based technique necessarily fails for MPH-k
valuations that are not subadditive. Indeed, even for two MPH-2 valuations, the integrality gap
may be as large as 12 (Proposition 6.13).
6.3. Notation and Key Lemma
Throughout this section, we overload the notation v(S) as follows. When S is a random set drawn
from distribution D, we use v(S) to denote ES∼D[v(S)]. Also, if X denotes either Alice or Bob, we
use X to denote the other player (i.e. if X = Alice, then X = Bob, and vice versa).
The following key lemma extends a well-known result of [Fei06] for XOS valuations to the
MPH-k hierarchy.
Lemma 6.4. Let v(·) be an MPH-k function, and let S ⊆ M be a subset of items. If T is a
random set such that every U ⊆ S with |U | ≤ k is contained in T with probability at least p, then
v(T ) ≥ p · v(S).
Proof. Let wS(·) be as promised from Observation 6.1. Then v(S) =
∑
T⊆S wS(T ), v(U) ≥∑
T∈U wS(T ) for all U , and wS(T ) = 0 for all T with |T | > k. Then we can conclude that:
v(T ) ≥
∑
T ′,|T |≤k
Pr[T ′ ⊆ T ] · wS(T ′) ≥ p
∑
T ′⊆S′,|T ′|≤k
wS(T
′) = p · v(S).
The first inequality follows from the fact that nonzero weights only belong to sets T ′ of size at
most k. The second follows because every subset of S of size k appears in T with probability at
least p.
It is also not hard to extend Lemma 6.4 to functions which are “close” to MPH-k.
Definition 6.3 (Pointwise β-approximation [DMSW15]). A valuation function v(·) is pointwise
β-approximated by a valuation class W if for any set S ⊆M , there exists a valuation w ∈ W such
that: (a) βw(S) ≥ v(S) and (b) for all T ⊆M , v(T ) ≥ w(T ).
Similarly, we say that a class V is pointwise β-approximated by a class W if all v ∈ V are
pointwise β-approximated by W.
Corollary 6.5. Let v(·) be pointwise β-approximated by MPH-k functions, and let S ⊆ M be a
subset of items. If T is a random set such that every U ⊆ S with |U | ≤ k is contained in T with
probability at least p, then v(T ) ≥ pβ v(S).
Proof. Let w(·) be the MPH-k function which pointwise β-approximates v(·) at S. Then we know
that: v(T ) ≥ w(T ) ≥ p · w(S) ≥ pβ v(S). The outer two inequalities are by definition of pointwise
approximation. The inner inequality is by Lemma 6.4.
13This protocol, which is not yet in print, was brought to our attention in a personal correspondence with Shahar
Dobzinski.
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6.4. Protocol for Subadditive MPH-2 Valuations
Here, we describe our protocol specifically for subadditive MPH-2, as it conveys the main ideas.
Our protocol will proceed as follows. First, we will solve the configuration LP relaxtion (defined
shortly) which finds the optimal fractional allocation. Then, we provide an oblivious rounding
which takes the fractional solution to a distribution over allocations. Assuming that both A(·) and
B(·) are subadditive MPH-k, the rounding will maintain at least a 12 +Ω(1/ log(k)) fraction of the
welfare.
Let’s now recall the configuration LP (defined below for any n, we only use it for n = 2):
• Variables: xi(S), for all bidders i and subsets S ⊆M .
• Constraint: xi(S) ≥ 0 for all i, S.
• Constraint: For all i, ∑S xi(S) = 1 (dual variable ui).
• Constraint: For all j, ∑S∋j∑i xi(S) ≤ 1 (dual variable pj).
• Maximizing: ∑i,S vi(S) · xi(S).
It is clear that the configuration LP is indeed a fractional relaxation, as any integral allocation is
feasible. Despite having exponentially many variables, there are only n+m non-trivial constraints,
and so the dual has only n+m variables. We quickly remind the reader of the dual:
• Variables: ui for all bidders i, pj for all items j.
• Constraint: ui ≥ vi(S)−
∑
j∈S pj for all bidders i and subsets S ⊆M .
• Constraint: pj ≥ 0.
• Minimize: ∑j pj +∑i ui.
We remind the reader that a separation oracle for the dual can be achieved via a demand oracle
for each vi(·) (recall that this oracle takes as input a set of prices ~p and outputs the set maximizing
vi(S)−
∑
j∈S pj). So the dual can indeed be solved in polynomial communication (and indeed only
requires demand queries of the valuations). Once the dual is solved, an optimal primal can be
recovered as well (for further details, see [BN07]). Most state-of-the-art communication protocols
(including all those referenced in Table 1.3) are derived by first solving this LP, and then rounding.
Indeed, our protocol follows this blueprint as well. Moreover, our rounding protocol is oblivious:
while we of course need demand-query access to the valuations in order to find the optimal fractional
solution, once we have this fractional solution our rounding scheme never looks at the valuations
again. The same rounding argument is guaranteed to work for all subadditive MPH-2 valuations.
Oblivious rounding scheme for k = 2. Draw playerX uniformly at random from {Alice, Bob}
(also referred to as {1, 2}).
1. Let ~x denote the input fractional allocation.
2. Let DX denote the distribution that takes set S with probability xX(S).
3. With probability λ = 0.5, draw SX from DX ; give set SX to player X; and give set M \ SX
to player X¯.
4. Otherwise (with probability 1 − λ = 0.5), draw set S′A from DA and set S′B from DB ; give
set S′A ∩ S′B to player X; and give set M \ (S′A ∩ S′B) to player X¯ .
Proposition 6.6. Let C denote the optimal value of the configuration LP. Then when Alice and
Bob are both subadditive MPH-2, the expected welfare of the above oblivious rounding scheme is
≥ 0.625 · C.
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Proof. Let bundles SA, SB be independent random draws from distributions DA,DB , respectively.
The first case of the oblivious rounding scheme achieves expected welfare of (in expectation over
randomly sampling X from U({1, 2})).
1
2
(vA(SA) + vB(M \ SA)) + 1
2
(vA(M \ SB) + vB(SB))
≥ 1
2
(vA(SA) + vB(SB)) +
1
2
(vA(SA \ SB) + vB(SB \ SA)), (6)
where the inequality holds pointwise for every instantiation of SA, SB and follows from monotonicity
of vA, vB . Similarly, the second case of the oblivious rounding scheme achieves expected welfare of:
1
2
(vA(SA ∩ SB) + vB(SA ∩ SB)) + 1
2
(vA(M \ (SA ∩ SB)) + vB(M \ (SA ∩ SB))).
To analyze the latter case we use the following claim:
Claim 6.7. Let vX be MPH-2 and let bundles SA, SB be independent random draws from distribu-
tions DA,DB, respectively. Then vX(M \ (SA ∩ SB)) ≥ 12vX(M).
Proof of Claim 6.7. For every pair of items i, j ∈ M , the probability that player X gets the pair
when allocated the random bundleM \ (SA∩SB) is ≥ 12 . To see this, observe that for player X not
to get the pair, either i or j or both must be in SA ∩ SB. By definition of SA, SB , the probability
Pr [i ∈ SA ∩ SB ] is equal to (
∑
S∋i x1(S)) · (
∑
S∋i x2(S)). We further know that
∑
S∋i x1(S) +
x2(S) ≤ 1 by the constraints in the configuration LP. This means that (
∑
S∋i x1(S))·(
∑
S∋i x2(S)) ≤
1/4, and therefore Pr [i ∈ SA ∩ SB] ≤ 1/4 as well. By applying the union bound we get that i and/or
j are in SA ∩ SB with probability ≤ 1/4. Applying Lemma 6.4 for MPH-2 valuations, player X’s
expected value for the random bundle M \ (SA ∩ SB) is thus at least 12vX(M).
By Claim 6.7 the second case achieves expected welfare of at least
1
2
(vA(SA ∩ SB) + vB(SA ∩ SB)) + 1
4
(vA(Ω) + vB(Ω)). (7)
Summing up the contributions from (6) and (7) weighted by their respective probabilities λ and
1− λ, the total expected welfare of the oblivious rounding scheme is at least:
λ
2
(vA(SA) + vB(SB)) +
λ
2
(vA(SA \ SB) + vB(SB \ SA)) + 1− λ
2
(vA(SA ∩ SB) + vB(SA ∩ SB)) +
1− λ
4
(vA(M) + vB(M))
≥ λ
2
(vA(SA) + vB(SB)) +
λ
2
(vA(SA) + vB(SB)) +
1− λ
4
(vA(M) + vB(M)) (8)
≥ 5
8
(fA(SA) + fB(SB)) = 0.625 · C, (9)
where (8) holds since λ was chosen such that 1−λ2 =
λ
2 , and by subadditivity of vA, vB (importantly,
note that (8) does not necessarily hold without subadditivity), and (9) holds since λ = 12 and by
monotonicity of vA, vB (both inequalities hold pointwise for every instantiation of SA, SB). This
completes the proof of Proposition 6.6.
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To recap the proof of Proposition 6.6, the fact that the valuations are MPH-2 means that if a
player “loses” in the second rounding case and is allocated the “leftovers”, this player still gets at
least half of her total value (see Claim 6.7). The fact that the valuations are subadditive means that
allocating the bundle in contention SA ∩ SB with some probability p to player X, and allocating
the bundle not in contention SX \ (SA ∩ SB) with the same probability to the same player, is as
good in terms of welfare as allocating SX to player X with probability p (see (8)).
Corollary 6.8. If Alice and Bob are β-pointwise approximated by subadditive MPH-2 valuations,
then the expected welfare of the oblivious rounding scheme is ≥ (12 + 18β )ω.
Corollary 6.8 follows by replacing Lemma 6.4 by Corollary 6.5 in the proof of Proposition 6.6.
6.5. Protocol for Subadditive MPH-k Valuations
We now generalize the oblivious rounding scheme above to subadditive MPH-k. The main idea
behind the approach is similar to our protocol for MPH-2: the “level 0” protocol that one should
try first is to simply draw sets SA and SB independently from DA,DB . Prioritize awarding items
in SA ∩ SB to a uniformly random player, and give the leftovers to the other. Of course, this
protocol might fail to beat a 1/2-approximation. But the only way it fails is if both Alice and Bob
have high expected value for the intersection SA ∩ SB . If Alice and Bob have high expected value
for the intersection, then we can instead just recurse within SA ∩ SB. The following protocol and
subsequent proof makes this formal.
Oblivious rounding scheme for general k ≥ 2. Draw player X uniformly at random from
{Alice, Bob}. Set r = ⌈log log k⌉.
1. Let ~x denote the input fractional allocation.
2. Let DX denote the distribution that takes set S with probability xX(S).
3. With probability λ = 12 , draw SX from DX ; give set SX to player X; and give set M \ SX to
player X¯.
4. For 0 ≤ q < r, with probability λq = λ2q+1 , draw 2q sets S1A, . . . , S2
q
A i.i.d. from DA and 2
q
sets S1B, . . . , S
2q
B i.i.d. from DB ; give set S
q = S1A ∩ · · · ∩S2
q
A ∩S1B ∩ · · · ∩S2
q
B to player X, and
give set M \ Sq to player X¯.
5. Otherwise (with probability λr = 1 − λ −
∑r−1
q=0 λq =
1
2r+1 ), draw 2
r sets S1A, . . . , S
2r
A i.i.d.
from DA and 2
r sets S1B, . . . , S
2r
B i.i.d. from DB ; give S
r = S1A ∩ · · · ∩ S2
r
A ∩ S1B ∩ · · · ∩ S2
r
B to
player X, and give M \ Sr to player X¯ .
Theorem 6.9. Let C denote the optimal value of the configuration LP. Then when Alice and
Bob are both subadditive MPH-k, the expected welfare of the above oblivious rounding scheme is
≥ (12 +Ω( 1log k )) · C.
Proof. The proof generalizes that of Proposition 6.6 and proceeds by analyzing the contribution
from each case of the oblivious rounding scheme. The first case of the scheme achieves expected
welfare of at least 12 (vA(SA)+ vB(SB))+
1
2(vA(SA \SB)+ vB(SB \SA)) (identical to (6)). For every
0 ≤ q ≤ r, the corresponding case of the scheme achieves expected welfare of at least
1
2
(vA(S
q) + vB(S
q)) +
1
2
(vA(S
q \ Sq+1) + vB(Sq \ Sq+1)). (10)
To analyze the last case we use the following claim:
Claim 6.10. Let vX be an MPH-k valuation and let bundles S
1
A, . . . , S
2r
A and S
1
B, . . . , S
2r
B be inde-
pendent random draws from distributions DA and DB, respectively. Let S
r = S1A ∩ · · · ∩S2
r
A ∩S1B ∩
· · · ∩ S2rB . Then vX(M \ Sr) ≥ (1− k42r )vX(M).
Proof of Claim 6.10. For every bundle of k items, the probability that player X gets this bundle
when allocated the random bundle M \ Sr is ≥ 1 − k
42r
: For player X not to get the bundle, at
least one of its items must be in Sr. By definition of Sr, the probability Pr [i ∈ Sr] is equal to
(
∑
S∋i x1(S))
2r · (∑S∋i x2(S))2r , where∑S∋i x1(S) + x2(S) ≤ 1 because the solution is feasible for
the configuration LP. This means that Pr [i ∈ Sr] ≤ 1
42r
, and by applying the union bound we get
that at least one of the items in the bundle are in Sr with probability ≤ k
42r
. Applying Lemma
6.4 for MPH-k valuations, player X’s expected value for the random bundleM \Sr is thus at least
(1− k
42r
)vX(M).
By Claim 6.10 the last case achieves expected welfare of at least
1
2
(vA(S
r) + vB(S
r)) +
1
2
(1− k
42r
)(vA(M) + vB(M)). (11)
We can now sum up the contributions from the first case, the intermediate case (10), and the last
case (11) weighted by their respective probabilities of λ, λq for every intermediate case 0 ≤ q < r,
and λr. Notice that λr−1 = λr. The weighted sum of the last two cases is thus at least
λr−1
2
(vA(S
r−1) + vB(Sr−1)) +
λr−1
2
(vA(S
r−1 \ Sr) + vB(Sr−1 \ Sr))
+
λr
2
(vA(S
r) + vB(S
r)) +
λr
2
(1− k
42r
)(vA(M) + vB(M))
≥ λr−2
2
(vA(S
r−1) + vB(Sr−1)) +
1
2r+2
(1− k
42r
) · C
=
λr−2
2
(vA(S
r−1) + vB(Sr−1)) + Ω(
1
log k
) · C,
Above, the first inequality follows by first observing that λr = λr−1, λr−2 = 2λr−1, and using
subadditivity of vA(·), vB(·) to combine the first three terms together. The last equality follows by
observing that k/4k < 1/2, and that r = ⌈log log k⌉.
Now, we wish to continue by induction and sum the last τ cases for τ ≤ r + 1. We claim that
the contribution from the last τ cases is at least:
λr−τ
2
· (vA(Sr−τ+1) + vB(Sr−τ+1)) + Ω(1/ log k) · C.
We have already proven the base case: this holds when plugging in τ = 2. Assume for inductive
hypothesis that the claim holds for τ , and we now prove it for τ +1. Then the sum of the last τ +1
terms is exactly:
λr−τ
2
(
vA(S
r−τ ) + vB(Sr−τ ) + vA(Sr−τ \ Sr−τ+1) + vB(Sr−τ \ Sr−τ+1)
)
+
λr−τ
2
· (vA(Sr−τ+1) + vB(Sr−τ+1)) + Ω(1/ log k) · C ≥
λr−τ−1
2
(
vA(S
r−τ ) + vB(Sr−τ )
)
+Ω(1/ log k) · C.
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The inequality follows by definition of λr−τ−1 := 2λr−τ , and because both vA(·) and vB(·) are
subadditive. This proves the inductive step. This means that the last r+1 cases together contribute
exactly (below, λ−1 := 2λ0 = λ:
λ−1
2
· (vA(S0) + vB(S0)) + Ω(1/ log k) · C.
Now, together with the weighted contribution of the first case, which is at least
λ
2
(vA(SA) + vB(SB) + vA(SA \ SB) + vB(SB \ SA)) ,
we get a total expected welfare of at least (recall that S0 = SA ∩ SB):
λ
2
·(vA(SA) + vA(SB) + vA(SA \ SB) + vB(SB \ SA) + vA(SA ∩ SB) + vB(SA ∩ SB))+Ω(1/ log k)·C
≥ λ (vA(SA) + vB(SB)) + Ω(1/ log k) · C = (1/2 + Ω(1/ log k)) · C.
This completes the proof of Theorem 6.9.
Corollary 6.11. If Alice and Bob have valuations that are pointwise β-approximated by subadditive
MPH-k valuations, then the expected welfare of the oblivious rounding scheme is ≥ (12+Ω( 1β log k ))·C.
6.6. Integrality Gaps and Hardness
In this section, we briefly derive integrality gaps and communication lower bounds for subadditive
MPH-k valuations based on previous constructions. We also show an integrality gap of 12 for MPH-2
valuations that are not subadditive.
Proposition 6.12. Let k ≥ 2. The integrality gap of the configuration LP with two subadditive
MPH-k bidders is 12 +Θ(
1
log k ).
Proof Sketch. The rounding algorithm presented above witnesses that the integrality gap is 1/2 +
O(1/ log k), and the construction from Section 3 witnesses that the gap is 1/2 + Ω(1/ log k).
Specifically, let S1, . . . , St be random sets of size k/2 that are all subsets of the same K ⊆M of
|K| = k. Then with t := √k, ℓ := log2(k)/2, {S1, . . . , St} is ℓ-sparse with probability 1−1/poly(k).
So consider the instance with f ℓS(·) = v1(·) = v2(·). Then in this case, we know that the best
achievable welfare is ℓ for an integral solution. However, the fractional solution which sets xi(Sj) =
1/t for all t is feasible for the configuration LP, and achieves welfare 2(ℓ− 1).
Proposition 6.13. The integrality gap of the configuration LP with two (non-subadditive) MPH-2
bidders is 12 .
Proof. Consider 4 items a, b, c, d. Alice has value 1 for bundle {a, b} and for bundle {c, d} (as well
as for any containing bundle); and Bob has value 1 for bundle {a, c} and for bundle {b, d} (as
well as for any containing bundle); all other values are 0. These valuations are MPH-2 since they
can be described as the maximum over 2 hypergraphs, each with a positive hyperedge of size 2
corresponding to one of the two desired bundles. The best fractional solution to the configuration
LP is x1({a, b}) = x1({c, d}) = x2({a, c}) = x2({b, d}) = 1/2; one can check that all constraints are
satisfied and the objective is 2. The best integral solution however cannot achieve welfare better
than 1, completing the proof.
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Proposition 6.14. Let k ≥ 2. There exists an absolute constant C such that the (randomized)
communication required to achieve a (1/2+C/ log k)-approximation for Welfare-Maximization
even when both Alice and Bob are subadditive MPH-k is Ω(e
√
k).
Proof. This is a direct application of Theorem 5.1, after observing that any subadditive valuation
defined on items K ⊆M (with zero value for all other items) is MPH-|K|.
Observe that the above proposition further means that our approximation guarantees for sub-
additive MPH-k are asymptotically tight among protocols with poly(m) communication whenever
k = Ω(log3m) (tighter calculations could get this down to log(1+ε)m for any constant ε > 0, if
desired). It remains open whether there is an impossibility result < 3/4 for two subadditive MPH-2
valuations (3/4 is implied already by the impossibility for MPH-1 = XOS [DNS10]).
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A. Missing Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.1. It is clear that f ℓS(X) is always defined at least once. The only way in which
f ℓS(X) could be defined multiple times is if σS(X) <
ℓ
2 (in which case f
ℓ
S(X) = σS(X)) and
σS(X) < ℓ2 (in which case f
ℓ
S(X) = ℓ−σS(X)). So assume for contradiction that both events hold,
and let X ⊆ ∪ℓ/2−1i=1 Ti, and X ⊆ ∪ℓ/2−1i=1 Ui, where each Ti, Ui ∈ S. Note that σS(X), σS(X) < ℓ/2
implies that such Ti, Ui must exist. But now consider that we can write M = X ∪X as a union of
≤ ℓ− 2 elements of S, contradicting that S is ℓ-sparse.
Proof of Lemma 3.2. We show (1) similarly to [BR11a]. First, σS(·) is monotone because if X
is a subset of ∪i∈Y Si, then X ′ ⊆ X is also a subset of ∪i∈Y Si (and therefore, any subcollection
of S that covers X also covers X ′, and σS(X ′) ≤ σS(X)). Otherwise if X is not covered by S,
then σS(X) = max{ℓ, k} and certainly σS(X ′) ≤ σS(X). Second, σS is subadditive: Note that at
least one of X,W is not covered by S if and only if X ∪W is not covered by S, and in this case
σS(X ∪W ) = max{ℓ, k} ≤ σS(X) + σS(W ). Otherwise, consider the index sets Y,Z witnessing
σS(X) and σS(W ), respectively (that is, X ⊆ ∪i∈Y Si and σS(X) = |Y |, ditto for W and Z). Then
X ∪W ⊆ ∪i∈Y ∪ZSi, and σS(X ∪W ) ≤ |Y |+ |Z| = σS(X) + σS(W ).
(2) follows directly from the definition of f ℓS , and the fact that it is well-defined: (2) clearly
holds for any set X for which f ℓS(X) is defined in (a), and also for any set X for which f
ℓ
S(X) is
defined in (b) (as both f ℓS(X) and f
ℓ
S(X) are ℓ/2).
(3) holds because if σS(X) < ℓ2 then f
ℓ
S(X) = σS(X) by definition. And if f
ℓ
S(X) <
ℓ
2 , the only
way this is possible (given the definition of f ℓS(·)) is if f ℓS(X) is defined in (a) to be σℓS(X).
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(4) holds again because if f ℓS(X) >
ℓ
2 , the only way this is possible (given the definition of f
ℓ
S(·))
is if f ℓS(X) is defined to be ℓ− σS(X).
(5) holds because by definition of f ℓS(·), one of three possible cases must occur: either f ℓS(X) =
σS(X), or f ℓS(X) = ℓ − σS(X) ≤ σS(M) − σS(X) ≤ σS(X) (using the ℓ-sparsity of S by which
σS(M) ≥ ℓ (which holds even if M is not covered by S) and subadditivity of σS), or f ℓS(X) = ℓ/2
and σS(X) ≥ ℓ/2.
Proof of Corollary 3.3. (Monotonicity) Let X ⊆ T and suppose for contradiction that f ℓS(T ) <
f ℓS(X). First suppose that f
ℓ
S(T ) <
ℓ
2 . By part (3) of Lemma 3.2, we can conclude that σS(T ) <
ℓ
2 ,
and therefore by part (1) (specifically, monotonicity of σS(·)), σS(X) < ℓ2 . Thus, by another
application of (3), we get: f ℓS(X) = σS(X) ≤ σS(T ) = f ℓS(T ), a contradiction.
Next suppose that f ℓS(T ) ≥ ℓ2 . By assumption, this means that f ℓS(X) > ℓ2 , so by part (4) we
have σS(X) = ℓ − f ℓS(X). Since T ⊆ X , by (1) we have σS(T ) ≤ σS(X) = ℓ − f ℓS(X) < ℓ2 . So
by applying parts (2) and (3) we have ℓ − f ℓS(T ) = f ℓS(T ) = σS(T ) ≤ ℓ − f ℓS(X), implying that
f ℓS(X) ≤ f ℓS(T ), a contradiction. Therefore, we have a contradiction in both cases, and we must
have f ℓS(X) ≤ f ℓS(T ).
(Subadditivity) Suppose for contradiction that f ℓS(X ∪ T ) > f ℓS(X) + f ℓS(T ). We first show
that f ℓS(X ∪ T ) > ℓ2 . Indeed, suppose that f ℓS(X ∪ T ) ≤ ℓ2 . Then f ℓS(X) and f ℓS(T ) are both
< ℓ2 , so f
ℓ
S(X) = σS(X) and f
ℓ
S(T ) = σS(T ) by (3). So by subadditivity of σS(·), we have
σS(X ∪ T ) ≤ f ℓS(X) + f ℓS(T ). Note finally that f ℓS(X ∪ T ) ≤ σS(X ∪ T ) by part (5). Thus,
f ℓS(X ∪ T ) ≤ f ℓS(X) + f ℓS(T ), a contradiction.
Now assume for contradiction that f ℓS(X∪T ) > ℓ2 . This means that f ℓS(X∪T ) = ℓ−σS(X ∪ T )
by (4). Observe also that f ℓS(X∪T ) ≤ ℓ. Since by assumption, f ℓS(X∪T ) > f ℓS(X)+f ℓS(T ), at least
one of f ℓS(X) and f
ℓ
S(T ) is <
ℓ
2 ; without loss of generality, assume that f
ℓ
S(X) <
ℓ
2 , so f
ℓ
S(X) =
σS(X) by (3). Using what we’ve concluded so far, we may rewrite f ℓS(X ∪ T ) > f ℓS(X) + f ℓS(T ) as
ℓ− σS(X ∪ T ) > σS(X) + f ℓS(T ), i.e.,
σS(X ∪ T ) + σS(X) + f ℓS(T ) < ℓ. (12)
We have that T ⊆ X ∪ T ∪X (De Morgan), and so σS(X ∪ T ) + σS(X) ≥ σS(T ) by subadditivity
of σS(·). Plugging this observation into Equation (12), we get σS(T )+ f ℓS(T ) < ℓ. But by parts (1)
and (5) of Lemma 3.2, f ℓS(X) = ℓ − f ℓS(X) ≥ ℓ − σS(X) for all X, a contradiction. We therefore
conclude that f ℓS(·) must be subadditive, as we have derived contradictions whether f ℓS(X ∪T ) ≤ ℓ2
(first paragraph) or f ℓS(X ∪ T ) > ℓ2 (just now).
Proof of Lemma 4.3. Consider the following randomized construction of S: For each i ∈ [k], j ∈M
independently, flip a fair coin. If heads, put j ∈ Si. Otherwise, don’t. We wish to show that the
probability that S is ℓ-independent is non-zero. We’ll again use S1i := Si, and S0i := Si.
So fix any set Y of ℓ indices, and any vector y ∈ {0, 1}ℓ (for simplicity of notation, index these ℓ
bits using the indices of Y ). We wish to consider the probability that ∪i∈Y Syii =M . If there exists
a single Y, y such that ∪i∈Y Syii =M , then S is not ℓ-independent. But if for all Y, y ∪i∈Y Syii 6=M ,
then S is ℓ-independent. So we simply wish to analyze the probability that this occurs for a fixed
Y, y and take a union bound.
For a fixed Y, y, observe that each element j ∈M is in each Syii independently with probability
1/2. So the probability that j is in some Syii is just 1−1/2ℓ. Moreover, these events are independent
across items j, so ∪i∈Y Syii =M with probability (1− 1/2ℓ)m. Now we wish to take a union bound
over all 2ℓ choices of y times
(k
ℓ
)
choices of Y to get that the probability that S is not ℓ-independent
is upper bounded by (the final two steps use our choice of ℓ = log2(m)− log2(x) and k = ex/ℓ):
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2ℓ
(
k
ℓ
)(
1− 1
2ℓ
)m
<
2ℓ · kℓ
ℓ!
(
1− 1
2ℓ
)m
< kℓ exp
(−m
2ℓ
)
= exp (ℓ · ln(k)− x) = 1.
As the probability that S is not ℓ-independent is < 1, we are guaranteed the existence of some
S that is ℓ-independent by the probabilistic method.
Proposition A.1. Every monotone and subadditive function over a set of m items is MPH-⌈m2 ⌉.
Proof. Let f be a monotone subadditive function. For every set S ⊆ [m] we construct a positive
hypergraph GS with weights wS , as follows: Let S
′ be an arbitrary subset of S of size min(|S|, ⌈m2 ⌉).
Set wS(S
′) = f(S′) and wS(S \ S′) = f(S)− f(S′). All other hyperedges have weight 0. Observe
that in our construction, every hyperedge with a non-zero weight has size at most ⌈m2 ⌉. For every set
T , let fS(T ) denote the value of T in GS ; so fS(·) is PH-⌈m2 ⌉. We argue that f(T ) = maxS{fS(T )}
and so f(·) is MPH-⌈m2 ⌉. It is sufficient to show that for every set S the following two properties
hold: (1) fS(S) = f(S); (2) fS(T ) ≤ f(T ) for every set T .
The first property holds since fS(S) = wS(S
′)+wS(S \S′) = f(S′)+ f(S)− f(S′) = f(S). The
proof of the second property is divided into four cases:
1. If S ⊆ T then fS(T ) = w(S′) + w(S \ S′) = f(S) ≤ f(T ).
2. If S 6⊆ T and S′ ⊆ T then S \ S′ 6⊆ T , therefore fS(T ) = w(S′) = f(S′) ≤ f(T ).
3. If S 6⊆ T and S\S′ ⊆ T then S′ 6⊆ T , therefore fS(T ) = w(S\S′) = f(S)−f(S′) ≤ f(S\S′) ≤
f(T ), where the first inequality is due to the subadditivity of f .
4. If S \ S′, S′ 6⊆ T then fS(T ) = 0 ≤ f(T ).
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